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Choices regarding labor supply and fertility by married women are 
generally made to maximize family welfare in harmonious marriages.  However, 
as the prospect of marital dissolution becomes likely over time, labor supply and 
childbearing decisions may not be formulated in a manner that are consistent with 
the goal of household utility maximization, rather they are often determined to 
improve individual post-marital wellbeing.  The current literature that addresses 
the effects of marital disruption on labor supply and childbearing within marriage 
assumes the choices made by the wife are independent of the actions undertaken 
by the husband and thereby ignores the possible strategic interaction between 
members of the household.  By exploring the strategic behaviors on the part of the 
spouses, we find new answers to some old questions.  
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Chapter 1: Literature Review and Nature of the Problem 
 
  In the basic framework of the consumer choice theory, rational agents with fixed 
endowments attain the goal of utility or satisfaction maximization by making tradeoffs 
between various goods.  This approach of modeling human behavior is sensible when 
choices are consequential only to the wellbeing of the decisions maker; however, an 
individual's actions often have an impact on the welfare of the group that the individual is 
a part of.  When the choices are constrained not only by personal but also by group 
preferences, it is crucial to understand the nature of interaction between members of a 
group in hypothesizing an individual’s behavior.  In this thesis, we study how people 
formulate plans in the context of the most intimate and important group there is: the 
family.  In particular, the focus is on the determination of labor supply and fertility 
patterns for married women in response to rising likelihood of marital dissolution.     
Much of the existing economic analysis either directly or indirectly deals with 
choices made by a family.  Yet, we still do not fully understand the process through 
which a family, functioning as an economic unit, allocates limited resources to optimize 
welfare.  The less-than-perfect understanding of the family is perhaps related to the 
relatively late emergence of the economics of family as a field.  Prior to Gary Becker, 
family behavior was rarely examined through the lens of economics.  Becker (1981) 
applied the neoclassical consumer theory to the analysis of family,  Becker suggesting 
that once two people find their "match" in the marriage market and together form a 
household, they pool their endowments (in terms of both time and wealth) to maximize a 
"household utility function."  The premise behind a household utility function is that 
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husband and wife share very similar, if not identical, preferences.  As a result, there are 
little or no distribution effects generated from various patterns in household consumption, 
and preferences of different household members can be aggregated into a common 
function.   
Using the structure of the household utility function, Becker analyzed the 
demand for children.  In his model, a family maximizes a utility function with three 
components: the quantity of children, denoted by N, the quality of each child, denoted by 
Q, and the aggregate quantity of other consumption goods, denoted by Z.  The 
introduction of child quality as a source of satisfaction for parents distinguishes Becker's 
theory from previous economic studies on the demand for children.  The quality of each 
child is assumed to be a positive function of the amount of expenditure on the child.  If a 
couple prefers a large number of children, the average quality of children is not likely to 
be very high given a fixed level of income.  On the other hand, if a couple cares a great 
deal about the quality of children, they would choose to have few kids.  Hence, there is an 
inherent tradeoff between quantity and quality of children in Becker's analysis.  
Mathematically, the household utility function takes the general form of: 
 
(1.1) U = U(N, Q, Z) 
  
  The objective of the family is therefore to maximize the utility function in (1.1) 
subject to the following budget constraint: 
  
(1.2) PCQN + PZZ = M  
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In equation (1.2), PC, PZ, and M stand for the constant cost of a unit of quality, 
the price of the aggregate consumption good, and the household income, respectively.  
Hence PCQN represents the total expenditure on children and PZZ is the total amount 
spent on other consumption goods.  If the utility function is maximized subject to the 
budget constraint with respect to the components of the utility function, three first-order 
conditions are derived (not shown here).  From the first-order conditions, we can infer 
that the true cost of quantity of children depends on the quality per child since a higher 
average quality of children raises the necessary expenditure on each child.  At the same 
time, the true cost of quality of children depends on the quantity of children since a larger 
number of kids leads to a higher cost of enhancing the quality of each child.   
Suppose there is an exogenous increase in the family income that induces a 
higher demand for both quantity and quality of children 1.  As mentioned before, an 
increase in N adds to the relevant cost for quality and in turn lowers the demand for 
quality.  Also, an increase in Q raises the shadow price of quantity and leads to a lower 
demand for quantity.  If the income elasticity of demand for quality is sufficiently greater 
than the income elasticity of demand for quantity, the negative substitution effect for 
quantity produced by a higher shadow price may dominate the positive income effect for 
quantity.  The net effects of an increase in income, in this case, are higher quality and 
lower quantity of children.  The quantity-quality tradeoff argument offered by Becker 
provides a critical explanation for the negative relationship between fertility and wealth 
observed in the last century or so.  
                                                
1 Both quantity and quality of children are assumed to be normal goods.   
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The assumption that all members of the same household have the same 
preferences is not entirely realistic.  Becker (1981), however, argued that as long as one 
member of the family is altruistic, the rest of the household would behave as if they were 
maximizing the altruist’s utility.   
  Becker defined an altruist as someone who cares about the welfare of others in 
the household while a selfish person is characterized as someone who has no regard for 
the wellbeing of others.  Suppose that person A and person S are the only two members 
in the household with A being altruistic and S being selfish.  A’s utility function takes on 
the form of  
 
(1.3) UA = UA(ZA, F (UA)) with ?UA /?US > 0   
 
where ZA is the consumption of a composite good by A and F is a positive function of US 
with  US being S's utility function.  By definition, S’s utility depends only on it’s own 
private consumption, ZS.  Since S’s welfare enters A’s utility function, A spends part of 
the income on S.  Effectively, A maximizes equation (1.3) subject to the following family 
budget constraint: 
 
(1.4) ZA + ZS = MA + MS    
  
where MA and MS represent the income of A and S and the price of Z is set equal to unity.  
As long as S’s utility is a normal good to A, A would raise the level of spending on S as 
the household income increases.  Knowing that the household income constraint dictates 
the amount of transfers from the benefactor to the beneficiary, S is likely to take actions 
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that maximize the joint family income.  If A is sufficiently altruistic and has a relatively 
high level of income, S may even sacrifice his or her own consumption initially in order 
to boost the household resources.  The insight that the selfish family member strives to 
maximize the income relevant to the altruist’s utility maximization problem, even though 
the selfish person does not gain satisfaction from the altruist’s happiness, is known as the 
Rotten Kid Theorem.   
  To see how the Rotten Kid Theorem works, we consider a simple example 
mentioned by Becker using the two-person household introduced previously.  Suppose S 
likes to eat using their fingers, but the act of eating with fingers by S annoys A.  S is 
aware of the consequences of eating with fingers and decides not to do it.  Becker’s 
explanation for S’s behavior is as follows.  A’s utility would be lowered if S eats with 
fingers.  As A’s utility is decreased by S’s action, A is likely to reallocate spending in a 
way that raises A's own consumption and lowers the transfer amount to S.  If the initial 
decrease in A’s utility from S eating with fingers is larger than the initial increase in S’s 
utility, the family income essentially goes down.  Since there is a reduction in the family 
income and S’s utility is a normal good, A would reduce the transfer by a larger amount 
than the monetary-equivalent increase in S’s utility from eating with fingers.  Being fully 
aware of the potential of being worse off, S would not choose to eat with fingers.   
   The rationale behind the Rotten Kid Theorem is both elegant and compelling; 
however, it is not generally correct, as shown by Theodore Bergstrom (1989).  It turns out 
that the validity of the Rotten Kid Theorem critically depends on the implicit assumption 
of transferable utility.  In the tale of eating with one’s fingers, Becker presumed that S’s 
action only creates a pure income effect, i.e., the “utility possibility frontier” only shifts 
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inward in a parallel fashion as S eats with fingers.  However, Bergstrom proved that S’s 
action causes a substitution effect as well as an income effect unless transferable utility is 
assumed.  Transferable utility essentially means that the sum of utilities within a group 
can be distributed in every possible way without the sum being altered.  Without the 
assumption of transferable utility, S can manipulate the slope of the utility possibility 
frontier in a manner that does not maximize the “family income” but is somehow 
favorable to S.      
   In the case when the singular-utility-function household cannot be justified, we 
need to recognize that choices in a family are made through a process of intricate 
interaction among the members and that the outcomes yielded in this manner may differ 
significantly from those generated from the “unitary” model.  Hence, the pertinent 
question is how should we formulate the decision-making process within a household that 
accounts for distinct preferences of various members.  Manser and Brown (1980) 2 and 
McElroy and Horney (1981) emphasized the importance of bargaining within a 
household and adopted the Nash cooperative bargaining approach as the appropriate 
model.  In their models, a household is composed of a husband and a wife and each has a 
unique utility function as follows.  
 
(1.5) Ui = Ui(Zi , Ri , G) for i = {husband, wife}  
 
where Zi is i’s private consumption good, Ri is i’s leisure, and G is a shared (public) 
consumption good.  Since leisure is a component of the utility function, each individual 
                                                
2 According to Manser and Brown, Becker’s Rotten Kid story is a special case of bargaining 
where the implicit rule is utility maximization of the altruist in the household.      
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faces a time constraint as well as a budget constraint.  Equation (1.6) and (1.7) specify the 
time constraint and the budget constraint, respectively. 
(1.6)      Ri + Li = T 
 
where Li is the labor supply by i and T is the time endowment.   
 
(1.7)   PZZi + PGG = WiLi + Mi  
 
where Pz and PG are the price of good A and good G, respectively and Mi is i’s money 
endowment.   
    The utility function itself is assumed to be independent of marital status (i.e., 
preferences remain constant); however, the level of utility is related to whether the 
individual is currently part of a household or not.  In the single state, Ui = Vi where Vi 
can be interpreted as i’s threat point in negotiation.  The threat points Vh and Vw are 
crucial in solving for the two-person bargaining game.  According to John Nash (1953)3,  
the solution is the combination of utilities, Uh* and Uw*, that maximize the product of 
(Uh – Vh) and (Uw – Vw).  McElroy and Horney showed that unless the threat points are 
invariant to changes in commodity prices and incomes, household demand functions 
cannot be reconciled with the single -agent model. 
    The unitary household decision-making model is not only problematic on the 
theoretical ground; it has also been challenged empirically.  In an interesting study using 
a socioeconomic survey of Thailand, T. Paul Shultz was able to reject the income-pooling 
assumption under the unitary model.  He found that, holding the total level of household 
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income constant, women with more nonearned income are more likely to have greater 
consumption of leisure (or time in nonmarket activities) and more children4.  It is worth 
noting that although Schultz's study invalidated the neoclassical common preference 
model, it did not fully accept the Nash bargaining model due to the lack of the exclusion 
restrictions needed to correct for sample selection bias.             
    The notion that the threat points in bargaining are the utilities attainable outside 
marriage in the Manser-Brown/McElroy-Horney model is not universally accepted.  
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) argued that in the presence of transaction costs, both 
financial and mental, divorce is not always a feasib le option when bargaining breaks 
down.  Instead, the outcome is perhaps “a noncooperative equilibrium defined in terms of 
traditional gender roles and gender role expectations.”  The specification of threat points 
in the Lundberg and Pollak framework produces drastically different implications from 
that in the divorce threat bargaining model regarding the distribution effects of 
government child allowances.  Allocation of gains from marriage in the Nash bargaining 
depends critically on each spouse’s threat point: whoever has the higher threat point 
extracts more surpluses from bargaining.  Government childcare allowances do not affect 
welfare of individuals once marriage dissolves.  Hence, if the utility in the state of 
divorce is indeed the threat point in bargaining, it is irrelevant distribution-wise whether 
childcare allowances are paid to mothers or fathers. On the other hand, if the threat point 
                                                                                                                                  
3 In the paper, Nash presented a set of axioms that the game must satisfy.   
4  The conclusion with regard to the childbearing behavior is more qualified.  Shultz only 
established the positive correlation between transfer income to the women and their fertility 
choice, but could not find a statistically significant relationship between their property nonearned 
income and fertility.  Thus, it is very possible that the causation between nonearned income and 
number of kids is the reverse, that is, women with more kids tend to receive greater amount of 
transfers from their relatives and other sources.    
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involves some noncooperative equilibrium within marriage, the person who receives the 
allowance is likely to have a higher threat point as a result of the transfer.  As the threat 
point for the individual is enhanced, she or he enjoys a higher share of household 
resources. 
    Lundberg and Pollak also cautioned that perhaps only the existing marriages at 
the time of policy change are affected by a government program that alters allocation of 
resources within households.  The redistributive effects of such program may be either 
completely or partially undone in marriages that are formed after the policy is 
implemented.  Suppose that child allowance payments are directly granted to women.  If 
binding pre-marital contracts can be negotiated in the marriage market to specify the 
distribution of gains from marriage, the government policy will lower the share of 
resources entitled to wives in future marriages by exactly the amount of the allowance.  
On the other hand, if there are no binding prenuptial agreements in place, the government 
policy will increase the number of women and decrease the number of men who want to 
get married.  As a result, the equilibrium number of marriages may either increase or 
decrease in the subsequent marriage market, and, in turn, the distribution of marital gains 
within households may change as well.      
    The cooperative bargaining approach of modeling decision-making within 
households is appropriate when marriages are in harmony; however, as tensions begin to 
mount within marriage, the element of cooperation in the everyday functioning of a 
family may disintegrate.  Hence, the Nash cooperative bargaining game is probably not 
suitable in analyzing household behavior when marriage becomes unstable.  As marital 
separation looming on the horizon, strategic interaction is likely to develop between 
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members of a family.  Therefore, a non-cooperative game is needed to study choices 
made by individuals in a fractured household.  Using a two-person intertemporal Cournot 
game, this thesis addresses a special type of problem that tends to arise in unstable 
marriages: the issue of moral hazard.     
    H. Elizabeth Peters (1986) speculated that the problems associated with moral 
hazard that are often cited in the labor market literature exist in the marital relationship as 
well.  In the context of marriage, moral hazard refers to the phenomenon when less-than-
optimal level of investment in marriage-specific capital is made due to the possibility of 
marital dissolution.  Historically, men have higher wage rates than women5.  Hence, in 
order to take advantage of specialization within households, husbands tend to work in the 
labor market while wives are likely to work at home 6.  The opportunity costs of engaging 
in marriage-related activities such as housework and childcare7 are wages forgone both in 
the present and in the future (in the form of labor market experience).  Women, who 
specialize in home production, bear the full costs in household upkeep and child-rearing 
while enjoying only partial benefits.  When marriages are harmonious, women perform 
the tasks in which they have comparative advantages to maximize the household welfare.  
On the other hand, if marriages are falling apart, women are less willing to fulfill their 
assigned “duties” since they need to insure against the state of divorce by working more 
in the labor market.   
                                                
5 The discussion about why men have greater earning powers than women is extensive and outside 
the scope of this paper.        
6  In the bargaining framework, we can interpret division of labor within households as the 
outcome of efficient negotiation.   
7  Raising children and maintaining an orderly house are obviously not mutually exclusive 
activities.  One can certainly argue that it is very difficult if not impossible to keep a house in 
order if there are children around. 
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    Two types of female responses to the rising likelihood of marital disruption are 
examined in this thesis: labor supply and fertility.  Both the labor supply and fertility 
choices associated with the problem of moral hazard within marriage have previously 
been studied.  Johnson and Skinner (1986) showed that increasing probabilities of 
divorce lead women to raise both labor force participation and work hours and the 
changes in behavior are particularly significant among those who have limited 
experiences in the labor market.  Lillard and Waite (1993) found that the hazard of 
marital disruption has a strong negative effect on the hazard of marital childbearing, and 
this effect is especially pronounced for women who have had at least one child.  
Although illuminating, both papers are empirical in nature and are not based on explicit 
models.  Here, a theoretical framework is developed to explore the link between labor 
supply, childbearing, and marital stability. The implications derived from the model are 
then used to guide the empirical analysis of the issues of interest. 
    The general set-up of the model is sketched below to further our understanding of 
the moral hazard problem that can potentially arise in the marital relationship.  We 
assume that two individuals, i and j, decide to enter marriage in period 0 upon observing 
the characteristics of each other in the marriage market.  The reasons why they choose the 
other person instead of someone else as a partner are not explored.  As a matter of fact, 
the marriage market is assumed to be completely exogenous throughout the analysis.  
Consequently, the choices made within marriage are independent of the potential payoffs 
one can receive in the marriage market, i.e., no remarriage is allowed in the model.  Once 
married, the couple  plays a non-cooperative two-person game repeatedly.  The game ends 
when one party chooses to divorce, or when both spouses perish simultaneously in period 
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T.  Following the Beckerian approach of modeling the demand for children, each 
individual k’s objective in a given period t is stated as below: 
 
(1.8)  max ktU  = 
k
tU (Nt, Qt, Zt ,?t)  },{ jik ∈∀   
 






τ  (or Nt = Nt-1 + nt), where nt  is the number of children added to the household in 
period t.  nt  is jointly determined by the husband and the wife, hence nt  = ),(
ji nnf ττ  with 
f′ > 0 (with respect to both inτ  and 
jnτ ).  Qt is the quality per child in period t.  The 
quality of children can only be manufactured using parents’ time.  Unlike Nt, Qt is non-
cumulative; it represents solely the amount of time that parents invest in their children in 
that period8.  Both the quantity and the quality of children are pure public goods since the 
consumption of which is neither rival nor excludable.  If individual i devotes itR  units of 
time nurturing kids, both i and j would enjoy a level of child quality equal to t
i
t
i NR /γ  in 
period t where ?i is an efficiency parameter indicating how well i transforms the input of 
time into the output of child quality.  Notice that “home production” in the model 
involves only nourishment of children and nothing else.  All other goods consumed by 
the household are lumped under the category of Zt that is purchased with wages earned in 
the labor market.  The total quantity of Zt purchased by the household is the sum of 
i
tZ  
                                                
8 If we regard the quality of children as a form of investment, Qt is said to have a depreciation rate 
of 100% in each period.   
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and jtZ  where 
i
tZ  and 
j
tZ  are bought by the income earned by i and j respectively.  The 
utilities generated from the consumption of Zt, however, take on the nonlinear form of 
),( jt
i
tt ZZgZ = .  We assume that 
i
tZ  and 
j
tZ  are enjoyed by i at different intensities, 
i.e., itZ  and 
j
tZ  enter i’s utility function in the form of 
iai
tZ  and 
ibj
tZ  with a
i > bi.  Zt 
hence is a “quasi-public” good in the sense that both i and j derive utilities from the 
proportion of Zt purchased with i’s labor income, but i enjoys Zt more than j does9.  One 
type of household consumption that can be classified as a quasi-public good is the 
expenditure on housing.  All members of the household gain satisfaction from the 
residential unit.  However, the person who bears the cost of housing is likely to get the 
largest bedroom and generally has more control over the usage of the house.  Finally, ?t is 
a parameter that represents the level of compatibility between the couple.  ?t is the only 
stochastic element in the model, it is equal to ?t-1 + et where et is a periodical random 
shock with the standard normal distribution.   
    In maximizing utilities, each individual faces the following constraints in each 






t LwZ =  
                                                
9 Becker’s altruist argument provides an alternative interpretation to Zt being a quasi-public good.  
Under the altruist interpretation, we can assume that each person only consumes the proportion of 
Zt that is purchased by her/his own labor income.  Although Zt is a private good that is consumed 
solely by the person who directly acquires it, the consumption of Zt by j can still enter person i's 
utility function (and vice-versa) since i cares about the welfare of j.  Also, in general, each 
individual weighs their own utilities more than the spouse’s utilities, hence ai > bi and aj > bj.  The 
altruist interpretation, however, is not entirely appealing since it implies that other than children, a 
full-time housewife (or househusband for that matter) does not have any direct private 






tt RRQN γγ +=  
(1.11) HRL it
i
t =+             
              
    (1.9) is the individual budget constraint which states that the consumption good, 
k
tZ , can only be purchased by one’s own labor income.  
k
tw  is k’s wage rate in period t 
and it equals to )( 10
k
t
k Lw −+ω  with 0'>ω .  This means that the current wage rate is a 
function of labor supply from the previous period and the individual’s “innate” ability10.   
Also, note that the labor income earned has to be exhausted in the same period, hence 
savings are not permitted in the model.  The technological constraint for home production 
is expressed by (1.10).  itR  and 
j
tR  denote the number of hours that i and j spend on 
nurturing children respectively.  As mentioned before, ?i and ?j are efficiency parameters 
in home production.  Unlike the wage rates, they are assumed to be invariant to the 
relevant experiences gained in the past; i.e., they are fixed in each time period.  (1.11) 
represents the time endowment constraint.  It places a limit (H) on the total amount of 
time available to an individual to work in the market and/or at home in each period.   
    Individual i’s complete intertemporal optimization problem within marriage is 
expressed as follows: 
 









t ZQNUE θβ  
                                                
10 If we assume that both partners had completed their schooling before marriage, k0ω can be 
interpreted as individual i’s educational level.   
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      ttt εθθ += −1  
   
    The stochastic variab le, ?t, determines whether the marriage dissolves in each 
period.  Once observing ?0, the compatibility factor in the initial period, the couple gets 
married while taking the expected lifetime utility generated from the union into 
consideration.  If ?t is deterministic (coupled with the assumption of no remarriage), the 
couple would choose to stay married until the terminal period T11.  However, since ?t 
changes unexpectedly over time, one or both individuals may want a divorce if the level 
of compatibility becomes sufficiently low.  Once divorced, each individual faces the 
intertemporal problem below: 
 










t ZQNUE β  where D is the date of divorce 
   
 
                                                
11 In a permanent income hypothesis framework without random shocks, the optimal rule is to 
have a constant level of consumption in every period.  Similarly, the optimal decision rule 
regarding marriage is unvarying over time if ?t is deterministic.  Since the couple made the 
decision to get married in the first place, remaining in the marriage must always be the optimal 
choice.  Suppose someone dissolves the marriage in a subsequent period, it follows that the couple 
would not choose to be together initially.  The additional assumption of no remarriage is also 
crucial to the time-invariant optimal rule of staying married since without the assumption, it is 
possible for more suitable mates to appear in later periods.             
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    subject to 1−= tt NN  




t NRQ /γ=  




t LwZ =    
 
    As marriage disintegrates, both the quality of children and the composite 
consumption good become private instead of public in nature.  It is easy to see how a 
quasi-public good like housing loses its public property in the case of marital disruption 
since divorcees generally do not share the same dwelling.  But, it is more difficult to 
imagine how a pure public good such as child quality can turn private when the couple 
separates.  It is perhaps a bit of a stretch to deny the existence of external effects from 
investment in children in the state of marital separation.  However, there may be a loss in 
the economies of scale associated with childcare when the family is fragmented; the 
transformation of the child quality from a public good to a private commodity is meant to 
capture that loss.   
    The absence of positive external effects in consumption in the state of divorce 
leads to, essentially, a decline in real income for both parties.  The person who previously 
specialized in home production within the marriage becomes susceptible to negative 
consequences of a low wage (unless the individual has a high w0).  According to Peters 
(and confirmed empirically to certain extents by Johnson-Skinner and Lillard-Waite), the 
problem of moral hazard arises when the homemaker guards against the adverse effects 
of a divorce by working more in the labor market as well as giving fewer births than she 
otherwise would.  Suppose person i is the one who concentrates on home production.  In 
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the current model, moral hazard means that itL  (labor supply) would go up and 
i
tn  
(number of newborn kids) would go down as responses to a decreasing ? (compatibility 






















.  However, as we will find out later, the 
optimal responses of housewives to marital instability are not always those suggested by 
Peters.  Indeed, the issue of “moral hazard” is more convoluted than previously thought.  
    In Chapter 2, we assume that the number of kids is constant for the duration of 
the marriage.  We use a general term, Ct, which denotes the aggregate pure public good in 
the household in place of the gross quality of all children, NtQt.  Once each agent's 
problem is reduced to an intertemporal tradeoff between working in the market and 
working at home, we can focus on the relationship between marital instability and labor 
supply.  The restriction of fixed number of kids in the household is relaxed in Chapter 3 
to allow the examination of marital disruption and fertility behavior.  Finally, in Chapter 
4, both the theoretical and empirical findings are summarized and the directions for future 
research are discussed.  
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Chapter 2: A New Look at Labor Supply and Marital 
Separation: The Household Production Approach 
2.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, we focus on how the expectation of marital separation may alter 
the labor market behavior of women.  The issue of female labor supply response to 
divorce had been examined previously by several studies.  In the most comprehensive 
analysis to date, Johnson and Skinner (1986) demonstrated empirically that women who 
experience rising probabilities of divorce are likely to increase labor supply.  Johnson and 
Skinner, however, did not fully consider the effect of reallocation of time on the value of 
marriage.  In light of the limitations of the current literature, a two-person dynamic game 
is constructed to explore the labor supply response to marital disruption.  The predictions 
derived from the intertemporal marriage game are significantly different from those of 
the prevailing view regarding divorce and the time-allocation choice made by women.                      
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 presents the 
static version of the game.  The dynamic version of the model is outlined in Section 2.3.  
Section 2.4 addresses the effect of changes in labor supply on the stability of marriage.  
Section 2.5 focuses on how labor supply decisions are influenced by the prospect of 
marital dissolution.  Section 2.6 explains how the theoretical predictions obtained from 
Section 2.4 and 2.5 can be tested empirically.  In Section 2.7, the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), the data set used to verity the validity of the theory is 
described and the preliminary results are presented.  The econometric techniques utilized 
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to estimate the model are presented in Section 2.8.  The results from the estimation are 
discussed in Section 2.9.  Finally, Section 2.10 concludes.     
 
2.2 The Static Model 
 
In order to analyze how the members of a family would modify labor supply 
behavior over time; we need an intertemporal framework in which the choices made by 
the husband and the wife are interdependent.  However, before we proceed to formulate 
the full dynamic model, it is helpful to examine the problem faced by the couple in the 
one-period game.    
According to Yoram Weiss (1997), there are four economic factors that 
contribute to the formation of a family by two individuals other than the production and 
rearing of children.  These factors are (1) sharing of collective goods, (2) division of 
labor to exploit comparative advantage, (3) extending credit and coordination of 
investment activities, and (4) risk pooling.  In this chapter, we assume the exogeneity of 
the fertility decision.  Rather, we attempt to incorporate the aspects of family that are 
related to (1) and (2) as well as an important non-economic motive for marriage, namely, 
the affection the companions have for each other.                     
Suppose a man and a woman form a family, each member’s static decision is to: 
 
(2.1) max θ+++= CZbZamU jiiii lnlnln)(  
      subject to iii LwZ =  
   jjj LwZ =  
  jjii RRC γγ +=  
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  HRL ii =+  
  HRL jj =+  
 
where  Ui(m) = person i’s utility in the state of marriage 
Zk = the market good purchased by person k (where k ∈ {i, j}) 
 C  = the household good  
             Lk = the number of hours worked in the market by person k  
             Rk = the time devoted to the production of the household good by person k 
             wk = the wage rate of person k     
             γk  = person k's efficiency parameter in producing the household good               
             H  = the total amount of time available in each period                 
ai  = person i's intensity parameter in consuming the market good purchased by i  
bi  = person i's intensity parameter in consuming the market good purchased by j     
             θ = the compatibility parameter between the couple 
  
Each person derives utilities from two types of commodity: the market good (Z) 
and the household good (C). The market good is obtained from the incomes earned in the 
labor market.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, Z is a quasi public good that is enjoyed by 
both members of the household.  However, each person gains more satisfaction from 
each unit of Z that is purchased by his or her own earnings, that is, ak > bk where k ∈ {i, 
j}.  The household good is a pure public good that can only be manufactured with each 
individual's time.  γi and γj, the technology parameters, determine the rate at which the 
input of time is transformed into the output of the household good.  Under this 
formulation, each person's problem is to allocate the fixed amount of time between 
working in the labor market and producing at home given the wage rates and the 
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efficiency parameters.  Hence, a more straightforward way to represent the individual’s 
single-period optimization problem within marriage is:  
 




     






−+++= γ 12  
  
The first-order conditions derived from the within-marriage optimization 
































 Combining equation (2.4) and (2.5), we find the following relationship between 
Li and Lj:    
 
                                                
12 Notice that the division of labor does not exist in the state of divorce.  As a result, increasing 
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Equation (2.6) captures the essence of specialization in households that was 
discussed by Becker (1981).  Becker suggested that in order to exploit comparative 
advantage, all household members (possibly except for one) should specialize in either 
the market or household sector.  According to equation (2.6), if person i is more efficient 
at home production than person j (γi > γj), then person i would work more at home and 
less in the market than person j.  On the other hand, if person i is less competent at home 
production than person j (γj > γi), then person i should spend less time at home production 
and more time in the labor market.  Complete specialization in the household, as 
hypothesized by Becker, is however not implied by equation (2.6) because of the log-
linear utility function assumed which restricts Zi and Z j to be strictly greater than zero. 
Becker's account of the division-of-labor story, as we have shown, is static.  It 
does not tell us how each household member's decision rule regarding time allocation is 
modified over the duration of the marriage.  When two people decide to form a family, 
expectation about their union is formed.  However, if the marriage turns out to be less 
than desirable, they may wish to separate.  As the prospect of divorce becomes likely,  
women who previously chose to "specialize" in home production may no longer be 
willing to do so.  They may begin to participate in the labor market to insure against the 
negative consequences associated with marital dissolution.  The intertemporal version of 
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the model will be introduced in the next section to enable the analysis of fluctuations in 
labor supply over time.   
2.3 The Dynamic Model  
In the dynamic model, we assume that a couple enters marriage in period 0 upon 
observing the compatibility parameter, θ0.  Without a divorce, the marriage lasts until 
period T, the terminal period, in with both the wife and husband are assumed to pass 
away.  After the initial period 0, the compatibility parameter in each period, θt, equals to 
θt-1 + ε t, where ε t is a random shock to compatibility and ε t  ~ N(0, σ
2).  In such a setting, 
each person’s problem is to  
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 Under this formulation, the control variable for each individual is the level of 
labor supply provided and the state variables are marital status, the wage rate, and the 
compatibility parameter. Following the decision to start a family, the couple 
simultaneously splits time between working in the market and producing at home.  After 
they make the time allocation choices, the compatibility factor in period one, θ1, is 
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revealed.  Once realizing the new compatibility parameter, each person then chooses 
whether or not to dissolve marriage.  To sum up, there are three events in each time 
period and they occur in the following sequence: (1) the realization of θt, (2) the decision 
about marital dissolution, and (3) the determination of labor supply. Once the marriage is 
terminated, both parties will remain single eternally.  In other words, we do not allow 
remarriage in the model 13 .  Thus, if the marriage is terminated, each person's 
intertemporal problem becomes one of deterministic rather than stochastic in nature.   
 At any period t, the person’s value function is defined as follows (we denote the 
set of state variables in period t as St): 
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t ++ −+++ βθ   
 
    where  β = the discount rate 
              E[ ·] = the expectation operator  
  P = the probability of staying married14            
Vit+1(m) = the value function at t+1 if the person is married 
  Vit+1(d) = the value function at t+1 if the person is divorced 
 
 
                                                
13 In the conclusion, we will discuss the ramification of relaxing this restriction. 
14 We will refer to the probability of staying married in each period as the probability of marriage 
hereafter. 
1[)()({































The particular comparative statics we are interested in is ∂Lit/∂E(θt+1), that is, 
how one’s labor supply is affected by changes in the expected compatibility between the 
couple.  Although individuals may very well respond to marital instability by altering 
labor market behavior, it is also possible that fluctuations in time allocation can increase 
the risk of divorce.  In other words, the direction of causation between labor supply and 
marital dissolution is ambiguous.  Instead of making a priori assumptions regarding the 
nature of labor supply and marital choices, we will explicitly sort out how they influence 
each other.  Hence, before proceeding to solve for ∂Lit/∂E(θt+1), we will find the effect of 
changes in labor supply on the decision to dissolve marriage in the next section. 
 
2.4       Effect of Changes in Labor Supply on the Probability of Divorce 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, without θt, the only stochastic element in the 
model15, the couple would always keep the marriage intact and the amount of time 
devoted to the labor market would be allocated in a fashion as to smooth the lifetime 
consumption.  Thus, the realized value of the compatibility determines the fate of the 
marriage in each period.  If θt were sufficiently high (i.e., above some critical value 
*itθ ), then person i would choose to stay in the marriage; otherwise, i would choose to 
divorce.  In this section, we demonstrate how the critical compatibility value, *itθ , is 
affected by the levels of labor supply in the previous period, itL 1−  and 
j
tL 1− .  However, 
                                                
15In reality, marital separation can be attributed to many different types of random shocks, such as 
an unexpected decline in earning power due to an illness or injury.  Such unforeseen incidents, 
however, do not exist in our model.    
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before we can do that, we need to accomplish the following: (1) establish the uniqueness 
of *itθ  by proving the concavity of the value function V
i
t(θt), and (2) characterize *
i
tθ .   
 
Claim 1: Vit(θt) is a concave function of  θt. 
 
Proof: Proof by induction on t.   
The single-period utility function, Ui(θ), from equation (2.1) is clearly concave in 
θ.  The value function in the last period, ViT(θ), which equals to U
i(θ), is then also 
concave.  We assume that Vit(θ) is concave in θ  for t = T, T-1,… ,t+1.  In order to prove 
that Vit is concave in θ, we must show that V
i
t[?θ1 + (1- ?)θ2] ≥ ?V
i
t(θ1) + (1-?) V
i
t(θ2).    










t+1(θ | θ2).  Since θt = 
θt-1 + ε t and εt ~ N(0, σ2), it must be the case that E(θt+1 | θt) = θ t.  Hence, we have  
 




t+1(θ1)   
 






From the definition of Bellman's equation, we get the following: 
 
(2.11) Vit[?θ1 + (1- ?)θ2] ≥ U
i
t[?θ1 + (1- ?)θ2] + EV
i
t+1[?θ1 + (1- ?)θ2]      
 
 From the assumption we made about the concavities of Uit and V
i
t+1, equation 
(2.12) follows below: 
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(2.12) Vit[?θ1 + (1- ?)θ2] ≥ ?U
i




t+1(θ1) + (1- ?)EV
i
t+1(θ2) 
    
















End of proof.    
 
Once the concavity of the value function Vit(θ) is established, we plot V
i
t(m), the 
value function in the state of marriage in period t, against Vit(d), the value function in the 
state of divorce in period t, on the same graph in Figure 2.1 below.  Since Vit(d) is 
independent of θ, it is simply represented by a horizontal line in the graph.  From Figure 
2.1 (on the next page), we can clearly see that Vit(m) and Vit(d) intersect at the point 
where the horizontal coordinate is *itθ .  Hence, we find a unique compatibility value 
such that individual i would choose to stay married if the realized θt exceeds that value 
and divorce if the realized θt is below that value.  We summarize the optimal policy 
regarding the divorce decision in Claim 2.     
 
Claim 2: If θt < *
i
tθ , where *
i
tθ  is the critical compatibility value at period t, person i 











                                                                                               Vit(m) 





                                  θit*                                                         θt  
 
 Once the compatibility parameter θt is observed at the beginning of the period, 
each spouse faces the marital dissolution decision.  The person would choose to remain 
married if the expected lifetime utility from staying in the marriage, Vit(m), exceeds the 
expected lifetime utility from initiating a divorce, Vit(d).  On the other hand, the person 
would want to separate if Vit(d) is greater than V
i
t(m).  Hence, another way to represent 
the value function at period t is:   
 








t+1(θt+1 | θt)}    
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We now proceed to characterize person i's critical compatibility value *itθ .  
From equation (2.14), we know that the following identity holds true at person i's critical 
compatibility value *itθ : 
 










 Substituting expressions from equation (2.2) and (2.3) into equation (2.15), we 
have the following:  
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where Lkt(d) and L
k
t(m) are the number of hours individual k (k ∈ {i, j}) works in the 
labor market in the divorce and marriage states respectively.       
 From equation (2.16), we can characterize the critical compatibility level *itθ  as 
below: 
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Now that we have determined the exact value of *itθ , we can perform various 
comparative statics to find out how the stability of marriage is affected by changes in 
each household member's labor supply.  Here, we only state the results of comparative 
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*itθ  represents the required level of compatibility that allows individual i to stay 
in the marriage.  Thus, individual i is less likely to remain married the higher the level of 
*itθ .  In other words, the probability of staying in  the marriage decreases as *
i
tθ  goes 
up.  If we denote the probability of staying married in period t (from the perspective of 
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 Result 2.2 states that given everything else held constant, each individual would 







































 is as follows.  The addition of work experience from the past 
leads to a higher wage rate in the present.  As the wage rate goes up, the individual's 
outside option (the lifetime utility in the state of divorce) improves and thereby a higher 
compatibility value is needed to prevent the marriage from being dissolved.  A higher 












 suggests that the probability of the couple staying together decreases at an 
increasing rate with respect to one's own labor supply.   
A rise in the spouse’s number of hours worked has the opposite effect on 
marriage. As the spouse's wage rate increases with the amount of human capital 
accumulated, he/she can potentially make a greater contribution to the welfare of the 

























 implies that the probability of the marriage remaining intact 
increases at a decreasing rate with respect to the spouse's work hours.      
 
2.5 Effect of Changes in the Probability of Divorce on Labor Supply 
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Now that half of the causal link between labor supply and marital dissolution has 
been uncovered, we are ready to address the rest of the mystery: how the expectation of 
divorce may alter the time-allocation decision.  If we maximize equation (2.8), the value 
function of individual i in the state of marriage in period t, with respect to Lit, the person's 
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The above first-order condition determines i’s optimal choice of labor supply in 
period t as a function of the belief about j’s level of labor supply16 and the probability of 
separation in period t+1.   
When we differentiate equation (2.8) with respect to wit, person i's wage rate in 


















Also, if we differentiate the value function of individual i in the state of divorce  
in period t, 17 we have: 
                                                
16 In the equilibrium, i's conjecture about j's level of labor supply corresponds to j's actual level of 















If we move the time period in (2.19) and (2.20) forward by one (from t to t+1) 



























































































































In order to find the optimal level of labor supply for each spouse, we need to 
solve equation (2.21) and (2.22) simultaneously.  However, the analytical solution for the 
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system of the two Euler equations is rather intractable.  Fortunately, the explicit solution 
for the exact levels of labor supply is not our primary focus.  We are more concerned 
with how the household members may change their time-allocation choices responding to 























 without solving for *itL  and *
j
tL .   
The expected compatibility value in period t+1, )( 1+tE θ , may have an effect on 
the labor supply functions of both i and j.  Hence, we can alternatively express (2.21) and 
(2.22) as the following:  



































Differentiating (2.23) and (2.24) with respect to E(θt+1) yields the system:  
     































































































































































































































































Examining equation (2.26), it is obvious that we need to find the second 









.  We get the following 
two equations if we differentiate (2.21) with respect to Lit and L
j
t, respectively: 


















































































































































Similarly, the following two equations are obtained if we differentiate (2.22) with 



















































































































































In Appendix 2.2, we show that under certain conditions, the denominator on the 
right hand side of equation (2.26) is positive.19  Assuming these conditions are satisfied, 









 is determined by the numerator on the right hand side of equation 


























































































       
 
















.  Also, closely 











 < 0.  It follows that the second term 
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, the rates of return from working (or wage growth) 



















                                                                                                                                  











































 is a sufficient condition for local 


















is sufficiently large. 
 






































is sufficiently large. 
 
 This scenario is ruled out since the sign of the second order condition would be 
negative and the assumption of stability of the dynamical system would be violated. 
 
















is sufficiently small. 
 




























































is sufficiently small.  
 











































0.    
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We can summarize the above four scenarios with Proposition 2.1.  
  



































 < 0.    
 
Since we are interested in the labor supply of women in this paper, we assign 
person i to be the wife and person j to be the husband.  Proposition 2.1 states that as 
compatibility deteriorates (which translates into the increasing probability of divorce), 
women would decrease labor supply if their wage growth is very low and their husbands' 
wage growth is very high; otherwise they would increase labor supply.  This finding is 
consistent with the economic theory of divorce offered by Becker, Landes, and Michael 
(1977).  Applying the Coase Theorem, they reason that divorce would take place only if 
the husband and wife both become better off as a result of marital dissolution.  If it is 
beneficial for one party to stay in the marriage, that person can always compensate for the 
other's loss as long as the total utilities of the two people when married exceed the total 
utilities when separated.   
Suppose we have a scenario where it is advantageous for the wife to remain 
married, but not so for the husband.  According to Becker, Landes, and Michael, the wife 
can potentially "bribe" the husband into staying in the marriage given that her gain from 
marriage is greater than his loss.  In the time-allocation framework, the wife can 
contribute to the welfare of the husband through working in the labor market or at home.  
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Depending on whether the husband benefits more from the market good or the household 
good on the margin, the wife may work either more or less in the labor market in order to 
please the husband.  Overall, there are two different effects that may push the labor 
supply choice of a wife who can extract gains from marriage in opposite directions as the 
probability of separation rises.  The first effect is the well-documented moral hazard 
problem that leads to an increased number of hours worked for the wife as a self-
insurance scheme.  The second effect is related to the preservation of marriage that calls 
for either an increase or a reduction in labor market activities20.  In Figure 2.2, we depict 
a possible time line faced by the wife to further illustrate the nature of these two effects.      
 
Figure 2.2: The Time Line Faced by the Wife 
 
0  D1  D2   T   
    
        
 The wife's objective is to maximize the present value of her lifetime utility from 
0 to T.  Suppose that in period D1-1, the wife anticipates a possible divorce in D1.  We 
first assume that the husband can gain from reallocation of the wife's time toward the 
market and that the wife can delay the divorce date to D2 by concentrating her efforts in 
the labor market.  In this case, both the moral hazard and marital preservation effects 
would make the woman increase the number of work hours.  On the other hand, if the 
husband prefers to consume more household good, it is then ambiguous whether the 
                                                
20 The marital preservation effect does not exist if the woman is better off in the state of divorce. 
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woman would work more or less in the market since the two effects would diametrically 
work against each other.  If the marital preservation effect outweighs the moral hazard 
effect, she would lower the level of labor supply and push back the date of divorce to D2 

















)(β  for the rest of her 
life.  However, if the moral hazard effect dominates, she would raise the level of labor 








)(β .                                              




























)(β   
 
The inequality in (2.32) is most likely to be satisfied by the combination of the 
high female and low male wage growth.  The low wage growth for the wife implies that 
the welfare in the state of divorce will not be greatly enhanced by the increase in labor 








)(β  tends to be small.  Also, the 
high wage growth for the husband signifies large potential benefits from a prolonged 


















expected to be large.   
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To summarize the economic reasoning behind Proposition 2.1: The sum of the 
moral hazard and marital preservation effects determines how women would respond to 
instability in marriage.  The moral hazard effect is always positive in the sense that it 
invariably leads to greater levels of labor supply by women as the probabilities of divorce 
rise.  The marital preservation effect, on the other hand, can be either positive or negative 
since women may either work more or less in the labor market to prolong the marriage.  
When the wife's wage growth is high and the husband's wage growth is low, both effects 
would lead the woman to raise labor supply.  When both spouses have either high or low 
wage growth, the marital preservation effect may be negative but is weak and thereby 
unlikely to outweigh the moral hazard effect.  Finally, if the wage growth is low for the 
wife and high for the husband, the negative marital preservation effect should dominate 
the positive moral hazard problem and the woman would increase the number of hours 
worked.         
 
2.6 Implementation of the Theoretical Predictions  
 
In order to verify Proposition 2.1 empirically, we need to determine what types 
of wage growth can be considered as “sufficiently high” and “sufficiently low."  It seems 
that any categorization of “sufficiently high” or “sufficiently low” wage growth would be 
rather arbitrary.  Hence, we decide to use the most general classification possible.  A 
person’s wage growth is considered to be “sufficiently high” whenever he/she has a 
higher wage growth than the spouse.  By the same token, someone's wage growth is 
regarded as "sufficiently low" if he/she has a lower wage growth than the spouse.  
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Proposition 2.2 below states the reformulated hypothesis that we will focus on in the 
empirical sections.       
 
Proposition 2.2.  Responding to the rising likelihood of marital dissolution, women 
whose wage growth is greater than that of their husbands would increase labor supply and 
women whose wage growth is less than that of their husbands would decrease labor 
supply.   
   
Proposition 2.2 establishes testable predictions regarding differences in wage 
growth, divorce probability, and labor supply.  However, before we can proceed with the 
test, measurement issues associated with wage growth and divorce probability need be 
addressed.     
 There does not seem to be a standard method in measuring wage growth in the 
current literature.  Of course we can always rely on the regression approach by estimating 
the wages of an individual at two different points in time and calculating the percentage 
change from one period to the next.  But, many of the important determinants of one's 
wage growth, such as ability and work ethics, are unobservable.  In light of the 
difficulties in capturing the idiosyncratic elements of wage growth with the regression 
approach, we adopt the "brute -force" technique of computing the percentage increase in 
the actual wages between two consecutive years.  There are, however, two complications 
associated with the brute-force method. 
The first complication arises when the respondents in the data set do not work in 
one or more years.  We use a simple example to illustrate the problem of missing data 
and how we deal with it.  Suppose we have data collected on an individual over a span of 
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3 years.  The person’s wage growth in any given year t (other than the first year21) is 
calculated as (wage in year t – wage in year t-1) / wage in year t-1. But if the individual 
chooses not to work, let's say, in year 2, we cannot obtain the wage growth for any of the 
three years.  To get around the problem of incomplete data in this case, we use the wage 
in year 3 (assuming the number of hours worked in year 3 is positive) as a substitute for 
the wage in year 2.  It follows that the wage growth in year 2 is computed as (wage in 
year 3 – wage in year 1) / wage in year 1.  Once an estimate of the wage growth in year 2 
is found, we use it as a proxy for the wage growth in both years 1 and 3.    
There is also an inherent selectivity problem in the way we estimate wage 
growth.  Since the percentage of the actual wage gain is used as the proxy for the rate of 
return from working, we have to exclude couples that have no work history at all from 
the sample.  The selectivity problem, however, is not serious.  Only a very small portion 
of the sample is kept out in this fashion.                
 Determining the probability of divorce for an individual in a particular year is an 
even more daunting task than evaluating wage growth.  Since the probability of divorce 
at each point in time is only observable to the couple, the researchers have to infer that 
probability from the events that take place in the subsequent years.  The researchers 
nonetheless are not able to detect changes in the likelihood of separation over time.   
Suppose we are attempting to figure out the probability of marital dissolution for a 
particular couple in 1980.  We can come up with a rough measure of the probability 
depending on whether the couple separated in the few years following 1980.  We cannot, 
however, find how the probability of divorce had changed from 1980 to 1981 from the 
                                                
21 We use the wage growth in year 2 as a substitute for the wage growth in year 1. 
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data.  As we will discuss in the later section, this inability to identify changes in the 
probability of divorce limits the effectiveness of our estimation techniques.             
2.7 Data and Preliminary Statistics 
 To address our question at hand, we need a longitudinal data set that has detailed 
information on each respondent’s marital and work history as well as other demographic 
characteristics.  The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for years 1979-1993 
contains such information.  The respondents in the NLSY were all between 14-22 years 
old in 1979, the year of the initial interview.  There were a total of 6,283 female 
respondents interviewed during the first year of the survey. 
  We are interested in whether women who have higher wage growth than their 
husbands respond to the possibility of marital dissolution differently from those who do 
not.  As a first step of the investigation, we examine the changes in labor supply over 
time for the following four distinct groups: (1) high wage growth women who eventually 
divorced, (2) low wage growth women who eventually divorced, (3) high wage growth 
women whose marriages stayed intact in the subsequent years, and (4) low wage growth 
women whose marriages stayed intact in the subsequent years.22    
 The sample-inclusion criteria in this exercise are as fo llows.  First, the marriage 
has to last for four years or longer.  Second, either the husband or the wife needs to have 
positive wage growth in at least one year.  Third, the wife has to be in her first marriage.  
Finally, if divorced, the woman must remain unmarried for at least one year.  The labor-
                                                
22 The references of “high wage growth” and “low wage growth” are all made relative to the wage 
growth of husbands. 
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force participation rates and hours worked for these four groups of women are listed in 
Tables 2.1-2.4.        
 Comparing Tables 2.1 and 2.2, we notice that for those women who subsequently 
divorced and whose wage growth exceeded that of their husbands, the participation rates 
and the number of hours worked went up by 12% and 289 hours from the fourth year to 
the year before the separation.  In contrast, the participation rates declined by 2% and the 
number of hours worked rose by 185 for the women who subsequently divorced and who 
had low wage growth.  The double difference in participation rates between the two 
groups is 14% and the double difference in the number of hours worked is 104.  These 
figures seem to correspond to our theoretical prediction that the moral hazard effect is 
much more significant for women with higher wage growth than their husband.  
However, these double differences may be entirely accounted for by the disparity in 
relative wage growth.  That is, we may observe similar differential patterns among the 
women who did not separate from their husbands.  In order to make inferences about the 
interaction effect between marital instability and relative wage growth, we need to 
compare the double differences obtained from the divorced women with those of the non-
divorced women.    
There is one difficulty in making the comparisons between the double differences 
for the divorced and non-divorced women: we cannot trace the labor supply behavior of 
the non-divorced women based on the date of dissolution.  We resolve this problem by 
doing the following.  First, we calculate the average age for the divorced women at the 
time of separation and the average divorce age turns out to be around 27.  It follows that 
the average age for each of the four years preceding the split is 23-26.  We then find the 
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levels of labor supply for the non-divorced women at the age of 23-26 and come up with 
the double differences accordingly.     
From Tables 2.3 and 2.4, we see that the double differences in the participation 
rates and the number of hours worked among the non-divorced women are 6.7% and 169 
hours.  Hence, the differences between the double differences (the triple differences) are 
7.3% (t-statistic = 1.35) and -65 hours (t-statistic = -0.58) 23.  The (relative) significance 
of the triple difference for the participation rates is consistent with the theoretical 
prediction that wives with different relative wage growth respond differently to marital 
instability.  The sign of the triple difference for the number of hours worked is, however, 
puzzling.   
 
2.8  Econometric Model  
 
 In Tables 2.1 and 2.2, it is shown that in the third and fourth year prior to the 
split, women with high wage growth actually have lower labor-force participation rates 
relative to women with low wage growth24.  The same phenomenon may very well be 
manifested in the cross-section sample.  Hence, in the econometric model, we should 
focus on the changes in labor supply from one year to the next rather than on the absolute 
levels of labor supply in a particular year.  Ideally, we like to examine how the changes in 
the probabilities of divorce affect the changes in the participation rates and work hours; 
                                                
23 Notice that the sample size is rather small since we only include women whose marriage lasted 
for at least four year. 
24 Recall that the wage growth in a given year is computed from the actual wages if the person 
participated in the labor market at the time.  However, if the person did not work in the market, the 
wage growth is estimated from the potential wages.  Since the women in our sample are fairly 
young (average age of 23 in the fourth year prior to the separation), it is possible that many of the 
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however, as mentioned previously, we can only infer the probabilities of divorce over a 
period of time from the subsequent marital history, not the true probabilities of disruption 
at each point in time.  As a result of this inability to estimate the changes in the likelihood 
of separation, we simply use the (constant) probabilities of divorce in the labor supply 
equations.   
Two separate systems of equations are estimated to explain the variations in 
labor-force participation and work hours across time periods.  The first system consists of 
a multinomial equation indicating how the participation status has changed and a probit 
equation specifies whether the marriage dissolves subsequently.  In the second system, a 
censored equation for the number of hours worked and a probit equation for marital 
separation are included.   


























where ∆Li  = 1 if individual i doesn't work in both year t-1 and year t 
                    = 2 if individual i doesn't work in year t-1, but works in year t.  
                    = 3 if individual i works in year t-1, but doesn't work in year t.   
                    = 4 if individual i works in both year t-1 and year t.     
 
  Xi  = a set of demographic and economic variables (includes the variable   
                       approximating the probability of divorce).  
  
                                                                                                                                  
young women who would have high wage growth were still in the process of completing their 
education and therefore not working.   
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(2.34) )1(Pr =Divorceob = F (ß'Yi) 
 
where Divorce = 1 if the individual has a subsequent divorce.   
     = 0 if the individual does not have a subsequent divorce.   
F  = the standard normal distribution.  
Yi = another set of demographic and economic variables (includes the variable    
        indicating changes in the participation status).  
 
 Since the decision to dissolve marriage and fluctuation in the labor-force 
participation status may be interdependent, we need to adopt the two-stage estimation to 
correct for the potential simultaneity problem.  In the first stage, reduced-form equations 
explaining the probability of divorce and the change in the participation status are 
estimated.  In the second stage, the predicted probability calculated from the first stage 
regression is used to obtain consistent estimates in the structural equations.  The religious 
and marital tenure variables are presumed not to affect labor supply choices, and thereby 
are excluded from the change in the participation status equation.  By excluding the 
religious and marital tenure variables, we overidentify the change in the labor-force 
participation equation.  The unemployment and health status variables are left out of the 
divorce equation because they are not believed to affect the probability of marital 
separation.  By excluding the unemployment and health status variables, we also 
overidentify the divorce equation. 
 The second system of equations is specified as follows: 
 
(2.35) iii XH εβ +=∆ '   
LYD i ti t += 3β
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where ∆Hi = the change in the number of hours worked from year t-1 to year t. 
Xi = a set of demographic and economic variables (includes the variable   
                     approximating the probability of divorce). 
 ei = the error term  
 
(2.36) )1(Pr =Divorceob = F (ß'Zi) 
where Divorce = 1 if the individual has a subsequent divorce.   
     = 0 if the individual does not have a subsequent divorce.   
F  = the standard normal distribution.  
Zi = another set of demographic and economic variables (includes the variable    
        indicating the change in work hours).  
 Since the "true" changes in the number of hours worked is not observable if the 
individual chooses not to work in either year t-1 or year t, equation (2.35) is modeled as a 
Tobit process.  Heckman’s two-step procedure is applied to preserve linearity of the 
coefficients.  In the first step, an inverse Mills ratio is calculated from a probit equation 
with the dependent variable in the equation set to 1 if the person works in both year t-1 
and year t, and 0 otherwise.  In the second step, the inverse Mills ratio is used to estimate 
the changes in work hours in an ordinary least squares equation.   
 The endogeneity problem between the probability of divorce and the change in 
work hours are addressed in the same manner as in the first system of equations.           
  
2.9 Estimation Results 
 
LYD i ti t += 3β
 51 
 The year 1986 is chosen as the sample year in the cross-section analysis for two 
reasons.  First, all women in the NLSY are at least 21 years of age by 1986, and thus 
matured enough to make marital decisions.  Second, a relatively large sample of 
subsequently divorced women can be collected.  If we have a sample year later than 
1986, many of the older women who separated from their husbands early on in the panel 
would be excluded.  The variables used in the regression analysis are briefly described in 
Table 2.5.  Means of these variables for the four distinct groups of women discussed in 
Section VII are presented in Table 2.6.   
A. First System of Equations   
We first focus on the results from the system of equations estimating changes in 
labor-force participation and the probability of divorce.  The number of women in each 
multinomial category is listed in Table 2.7.  The reduced-form and structural multinomial 
logit equations are presented in Table 2.8 and 2.9, respectively.  The coefficients for 
"choice" 1 (not working in both 1985 and 1986) are normalized to zero.  The coefficients 
for the other three "choices" are therefore all relative to the case of non-participation in 
both years.  Our primary concern is with women who were not previously in the labor 
market, but decided to enter upon learning that their marriages may be in trouble.  Hence, 
we need to focus on the comparison between the choice of not working in both years and 
the choice of not working in 1985 but working in 1986.  The coefficients under the 
Choice 2 column give us this comparison.25   
                                                
25 In the multinomial  logit regression, the "marginal effect" of a variable can be found by raising 
the coefficient to its exponent.  The exponentiated value of the coefficient represents the effect of 
a one-unit change in the variable on the likelihood of the choice relative to the base choice.       
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From the structural equation that estimates the changes in the participation status 
(Table 2.9), it seems that age, race, the presence of young children, and fluctuation in 
unemployment rates have no impact on whether choice 1 or choice 2 is made.  The 
coefficient on education suggests that an additional year of schooling raises the odds of 
ending up in category 2 (relative to category 1) by 14%.  Having bad health that prevents 
one from working for pay, on the other hand, lowers the likelihood of being in category 2 
by 69%.  The barely significant coefficient on the husband’s income indicates that a 
$10,000 increase in the husband's income lowers the probability of the wife working in 
the second year by 17.7%      
The three variables that we have particular interests in are wage growth, divorce 
probability, and the interaction term between wage growth and divorce probability.  The 
insignificance of the coefficient on wage growth tells us that difference in relative wage 
growth, by itself, is not sufficient to induce women to alter their decisions regarding 
labor-force participation.  As we will see, the effect of the difference in relative wage 
growth between the wife and husband only becomes significant when it is interacted with 
the probability of marital dissolution.  The extraordinarily large coefficient on the 
probability of divorce suggests that it is far less likely for someone with lower wage 
growth than her husband to be in category 2 as the marriage becomes less stable.  
Combining the coefficients on the probability of divorce and the interaction term suggests 
that a rise in the likelihood of separation would also reduce the incentive to participate in 
the labor market for women who have higher wage growth than their husbands.  
However, the magnitude of the reduction is substantially smaller compared with wives 
who have relatively lower wage growth.   
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Contrary to the studies in the past, we discover that an increase in the probability 
of divorce universally discourages women from participating in the labor market with the 
negative effect being especially pronounced among those who have lower wage growth 
than the husbands.  Our result weakly supports Proposition 2 which predicts that women 
with lower wage growth than their husbands would reduce labor supply as marriage 
becomes less stable.  Although the propensity to increase labor supply by wives who 
have higher wage growth than their husbands is not confirmed by the data, we do find 
high wage growth women to be more likely to participate in the labor market relative to 
those with low wage growth.      
The reduced-form and structural probit equations are listed respectively in Tables 
2.10 and 2.11.  According to Table 2.11, a woman is more likely to have a divorce if she 
is a Baptist, Catholic, or living in the South.  Each year of education also raises the 
probability of divorce by 1.8%.  On the other hand, she is less likely to get separated if 
she lives in a non-urban area, has a child, or the older she is.  Once we hold the age of 
woman constant, the length of marriage has no effect on the probability of divorce.  
Probability of choice2 has a significantly positive effect on divorce.  This positive 
coefficient, however, does not necessarily mean that the probability of divorce is raised 
by participation in the labor market.  The probability difference of somebody who 
chooses not workin g in 1985, but working in 1986, is not relative to not working in both 
years in the divorce equation.  Instead, it is compared to all other possibilities.  These 
possibilities include working in 1985 but not working in 1986, working in both years, as 
well as not working in both years.  The marginal effect of choice 2 indicates that the 
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probability of marital separation would increase by 0.8% as women become 1% more 
likely to be in category 2.   
B. Second System of Equations  
We now turn our attention to the system of equations that estimates changes in 
the number of hours worked and probabilities of divorce.  Here, we only focus on the 
equation explaining changes in work hours.  As explained in the previous section, 
changes in the number of work hours are estimated as a Tobit equation in order to 
account for the potential variations attributed to women who did not work in both 1985 
and 1986.  The probit equation that estimates the inverse Mills ratio is presented in Table 
2.12.  The coefficients for the OLS equation are listed in Table 2.13.  Examining Table 
2.13, the only variables that are remotely significant are husband’s income, the youngest 
child with age > 3, and divorce probability.  On average, a $10,000 increase in the 
husband’s income lowers the wife's annual number of hours worked by 41 hours.  If the 
youngest child in the family is older than 3, the mother works 292 hours more in a year.  
However, this coefficient is barely significant.  A ten-percent increase in the probability 
of divorce raises the number of hours worked by almost 197 hours.  However, the 
increase in the divorce probability does not have differential effects on women with 




 An intertemporal Cournot Nash game is constructed to analyze the dynamic 
interaction between members of the same household with both labor supply and marital 
dissolution as endogenous choice variables.  The theory predicts that given everything 
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else held constant, an increase in the female labor supply makes it more likely for women 
to dissolve marriage but less so for men.  However, as a wife increases her activities in 
the labor market, she invariably lowers the amount of time used on home production.  If 
her husband benefits more from the household good than from the market good at the 
margin, the increase in her level of labor supply would diminish the value of marriage to 
the husband.  This insight turns out to be crucial in explaining how women would alter 
labor market behavior as the likelihood of marital separation goes up.   
In hypothesizing the female labor supply response to unstable marriage, we 
establish an analytical equivalence to the substitution and income effects induced by a 
change in the price of a commodity.  According to the consumer choice theory, the 
overall consumption of a good may rise or fall as the price changes since the substitution 
and income effects may conflict with each other.  In the case of marital dissolution, 
women may either increase or decrease the levels of labor supply as the probabilities of 
divorce escalate depending on the relative magnitudes of the moral hazard and marital 
preservation effects.  When marriage becomes unstable, the moral hazard effect always 
leads the wife to increase labor supply.  However, the marital preservation effect may 
bring the woman to work more or less in the labor market.  It is most likely for the 
marital preservation effect to be negative and overshadow the moral hazard effect when 
the wage growth of the wife is small and the wage growth of the husband is large.   
Our theory can perhaps help explain the empirical finding (by Johnson and 
Skinner) that the increases in female labor supply have no effects on the probabilities of 
marital separation.  In the context of the theory, only women with low wage growth 
would heighten the likelihood of dissolution by working more in the market.  However, 
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they would not increase labor supply in the first place due to the fear that they may lose 
the gains from marriage if devoting less time to the production of the household good.   
We also attempt to empirically verify the modified theoretical prediction that 
women with lower wage growth than their husbands would work less in the market as the 
probabilities of divorce increase.  When we use labor-force participation as an in 
indicator for labor supply, it is found that as marriage grows unstable, women generally 
become less likely to join the labor force, and those with low relative wage growth are 
especially reluctant to do so.  However, when the number of work hours is utilized as the 
proxy for labor supply, we find the probability of divorce raises the number of hours 
worked.  There is, however, no statistically significant difference can be detected 
between women with different relative wage growth.                                                                         
Finally, two restrictive assumptions are made in the model.  First, no remarriage 
is allowed; once the decision to separate is consummated, both the man and woman 
remain single for the rest of their lives.  Second, the efficiency parameters in home 
production are invariant to the amount of time spent on the manufacturing of the 
household good.  If we relax both assumptions, the main results from the model remain 
valid.  As marriages become less stable, women with high wage growth would be even 
more inclined to increase labor supply since they can improve their positions in the 
marriage market with higher wage rates.  At the same time, women with low wage 
growth would have more incentives to concentrate on the home production, as the 
development of domestic skills is their most effective means to attract potential mates in 
the future.   
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We do not incorporate the decision to bear children in the model.  However, the 
fertility choice is often determined simultaneously with marital dissolution and labor 
supply.  The natural extension of the theory is to encompass the fertility behavior and 
analyze how the childbearing decision is carried out in the context of value of marriage.    



































Table 2.1: Women Who Divorced Subsequently and Whose Wage Growth in 









Hours Worked Conditional on 
Participation  
-4 23.5 0.77 (0.42) 1021 (865) 1320 
-3 24.5 0.80 (0.40) 1072 (868) 1341 
-2 25.5 0.84 (0.37) 1165 (872)  1389 
-1 26.5 0.89 (0.31) 1310 (871) 1466 









Table 2.2: Women Who Divorced Subsequently and Whose Wage Growth in 









Hours Worked Conditional 
on Participation  
-4 22.9 0.83 (0.37) 1201 (873) 1442 
-3 23.9 0.80 (0.40) 1223 (897) 1528 
-2 24.9 0.79 (0.41) 1219 (932)  1542 
-1 25.9 0.81 (0.39) 1386 (946) 1702 














Table 2.3: Women Who Did Not Divorce Subsequently and Whose Wage 








Hours Worked Conditional on 
Participation  
 23 0.76 (0.43) 1008 (856) 1322 
 24 0.78 (0.42) 1081 (862) 1388 
 25 0.80 (0.40) 1142 (873)  1422 
 26 0.80 (0.40) 1165 (942) 1458 
Total 
Change  









Table 2.4: Women Who Did Not Divorce Subsequently and Whose Wage 
Growth is Less than that of the Husbands (Group 4). 
 




Hours Worked Conditional on 
Participation  
 23 0.77 (0.42) 1120 (873) 1452 
 24 0.74 (0.44) 1108 (893) 1488 
 25 0.76 (0.43) 1132 (888)  1491 
 26 0.74 (0.44) 1108 (889) 1495 
Total 
Change  

















Table 2.5: Description of Variables 
 
 
Age  Age of the respondent  
Education Years of Education   
Income Husband's Total Income 
Race Dummy, = 1 if the person is nonwhite 
Tenure Years of marriage 
Tenure2 Tenure Squared 
Second Dummy, = 1 if the person is in second marriage or above 
Baptist Dummy, = 1 if the person is a Baptist  
Catholic Dummy, = 1 if the person is a Catholic 
Frequency Frequency of religious attendance (scaled between 1-6 
with 1 = never) 
Nonurban  Dummy, = 1 if residence is in an nonurban area 
South Dummy, = 1 if residence is in the South  
Kid<3  Dummy, = 1 if the youngest child is less than 3 years old 
Kid>3  Dummy, = 1 if the youngest child is more than 3 years old 
Participation
85 
Dummy, = 1 if working in 1985 
Participation
86 
Dummy, = 1 if working in 1986 
Hours85 Number of hours worked in 1985  
Hours86 Number of hours worked in 1986 
Bad health Dummy, = 1 if health would prevent working for pay 
Unemployme
nt 













Table 2.6: Means of Variables in 1986 by Subsequent Marital Status and 










     
Age  24.6 25.27 25.42 25.34 
Education 12.14 12.36 12.48 12.28 
Income 18,856 17936 19831 18185 
Race 0.21 0.24 0.18 0.19 
Tenure 5.13 5.27 5.32 5.37 
Second 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.05 
Baptist 0.31 0.30 0.24 0.26 
Catholic 0.33 0.42 0.35 0.36 
Frequency 3.08 3.2 3.11 3.19 
Nonurban  0.25 0.24 0.2 0.3 
South 0.46 0.45 0.39 0.41 
Kid<3  0.87 0.80 0.81 0.81 
Kid>3  0.11 0.16 0.17 0.17 
Participation
85 
0.77 0.89 0.79 0.78 
Participation
86 
0.84 0.88 0.79 0.74 
Hours85 1017 1302 1100 1159 
Hours86 1080 1331 1106 1139 
Bad health 0.026 0.01 0.032 0.028 
Unemploy-
ment 
-0.10% -0.09% -0.02% -0.05% 
 
























1 238 .1489 
2 97 .0607 
3 121 .0757 
4 1142 .7146 
  
 
where 1 = not working in both 1985 and 1986 (coefficients normalized to zero). 
            2 = not working in 1985, but working in 1986.  
           3 = working in 1985, but not working in 1986.   
























Table 2.8: First-Stage Multinomial Logit Equation for Changes in Labor-
Force Participationa 
 











 0.1155  
(2.5) 













































































































a The t-statistics are shown in parentheses 
b Wage growth is a dummy variable.  Wage growth = 1 if the wife's wage growth 
is greater than the husband's wage growth, and = 0 otherwise. 
 
 































































































a The t-statistics are shown in parentheses 
b Growth x probability is an interaction term between divorce probability and 




Table 2.10: First-Stage Divorce Probit Equation  
   
 
Variable  Coefficient (T-
Statistic)    
Marginal 
Effect  
Constant  0.6337 (1) 0.1325 
Age  -0.0747 (3.13) -0.0156 
Education  0.0126 (0.56) 0.0026 
Income x106  0.1578 (0.05) 0.0333 
Nonwhite   0.1259 (1.18) 0.0263 
Tenure -0.04 (0.64) -0.0084 
Tenure2  0.0057 (1.16) 0.0012 
Second  0.3113 (1.81) 0.0651 
Baptist  0.1618 (1.49) 0.0338 
Catholic  0.2017 (2.02) 0.0422 
Frequency -0.0097 (0.39) -0.0020 
Nonurban -0.0243 (0.24) -0.0051 
South  0.1017 (1.11) 0.0213 
Kid<3 -0.2531 (0.85) -0.0529 
Kid>3  -0.4247 (1.38) -0.0888 
Wage growth  0.2087 (2.58) 0.0437 
Bad health  -0.3153 (1.15) -0.0659 










Table 2.11: Second-Stage Divorce Probit Equation      
 
 




Constant -0.3516 (0.48)  -0.0734 
Age  -0.0662 (2.58) -0.0138 
Education  0.0837 (1.78)  0.0175 
Income x106  -0.7223 (0.15) -0.1507 
Nonwhite   0.0375 (0.33) 0.0078 
Tenure -0.0721 (1.04) -0.0150 
Tenure2  0.0075 (1.4) 0.0016 
Second  0.1275 (0.69) 0.0266 
Baptist  0.3661 (2.88) 0.0764 
Catholic  0.3885 (3.23) 0.0810 
Frequency -0.033 (1.23)  -0.0069 
Nonurban -0.179 (1.65) -0.0373 
South  0.2718 (2.49) 0.0567 
Kid<3 -0.5425 (1.65) -0.1132 
Kid>3  -0.6195 (1.94) -0.1292 
Probability of 
Choice 2 
 4.0197 (3.15) 0.8385 
Probability of 
Choice 3 
1.2441 (1.02) 0.2595 
Probability of 
Choice 4 






















Constant  -1.6518 
(2.14) 
Age  0.006  
(0.29) 
Education  0.1859 
(10.38) 






Kid>3  -0.1525 
(0.49) 
Bad health  -0.6336  
(3.1) 

































Constant  -974.34 (0.97) 
Age -6.35 (0.51) 
Education  59.77 (1.12) 
Income × 104  -41.44 (1.73) 
Nonwhite -89.05 (1.48) 
Kid<3 -52.98 (0.28)  
Kid>3     292.6 (1.66) 
Bad health  -419.72 (1.56) 
Unemployment  -51.09 (0.91) 
Wage growth  147.48 (1.1) 
Divorce probability  1967.02 (1.8)  
Growth x probability -1476.26 (1.44)  
Inverse Mills Ratio  602.25 (0.96) 
 
 













Chapter 3: Marital Separation, Childbearing, and Returns from 
Labor Market 
 
3.1       Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, we utilized an intertemporal Cournot game to address the issue of 
labor supply and marital dissolution.  In this chapter, we analyze the female fertility 
response to the increasing probability of divorce by relaxing the assumption of a fixed 
number of children in the model presented in Chapter 2.     
Most of the research that deals with marriage and fertility focuses on how 
childbearing affects the stability of marriage but ignores the potential influence of marital 
dissolution on the fertility behavior.  There are few studies that address the simultaneous 
relationship between marital disruption and childbearing.  Koo and Janowitz (1983) 
estimated a simultaneous logit model to examine the probability of divorce and of giving 
birth in a given period, but no significant causal relationships were discovered in their 
analysis.  Lillard and Waite (1993) estimated a joint hazards model and found that the 
hazard of disruption has strong negative effects on the hazard of marital childbearing, and 
this effect appears to be most pronounced among women who have had at least one child.  
Lillard and Waite, however, did not include labor supply in their study and 
thereby overlooked the close ties between marital stability, fertility choice, and labor 
market activity.  By considering the actual or potential labor market opportunities 
available to each member of the household, we can gain a better understanding about 
how the decisions regarding childbearing and marital dissolution are formulated.   
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 outlines the model 
from Chapter 2 and introduces the fertility variable into the framework.  Section 3.3 deals 
with the effect of children on the stability of marriage.  Section 3.4 addresses how the 
possibility of marital separation influences the decision to give birth.  Some descriptive 
statistics are presented in Section 3.5.  In Section 3.6, the econometric model used to test 
the theoretical prediction is explained.  In Section 3.7, the restrictions on the sample are 
stated.  The results from estimation are discussed in Section 3.8.  Finally, Section 3.8 
concludes. 
             
3.2       The Basic Model   
 
In this section, we present the general framework of the theory with an emphasis 
on the incorporation of the fertility choice.  The utility function is assumed to take on the 
quasi-log-linear form and each individual's static utility maximization problem is as 
follows: 
 
In the marriage state: 
(3.1) max  θ+−+++= )ln(lnlnln)(
_
QQNZbZamU jiiii  
subject to iii LwZ =                         
     jjj LwZ =  





jjii )( γγ +=  
    HRL ii =+  
  HRL jj =+  
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In the divorce state:  
(3.2) max   )ln(lnln)(
_
QQNZdU ii −++=  






  HRL ii =+  
    
Where Ui(m) = person i’s utility in the state of marriage 
 Ui(d) = person i's utility in the state of divorce 
Zk = the market good purchased by person k (where k ∈ {i, j}) 
 N = the number of children  
 Q = the average quality of children 
 
_
Q = the minimum level of quality per child     
             Lk = the number of hours worked in the market by person k where  
             Rk = the time spent on childcare by person k 
             wk = the wage rate of person k     
             γk  = the efficiency parameter in childcare for person k                
             H  = the total amount of time available in each period                 
ai  = person i's intensity parameter in consuming the market good purchased by i  
bi  = person i's intensity parameter in consuming the market good purchased by j     
θ = the compatibility parameter between the couple 
 
 Each individual derives utilities from children and the market consumption good 
(Z).  Following Becker's approach, children enter the utility function in the forms of both 
quantity (N) and quality (Q).  We assume that the quality of each child in the household 
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is the same and the required minimum level of quality is 
_
Q .  Also, the quality of children 
cannot be "bought" in the market in the sense that it can only be cultivated through 
parental care.  In other words, the child quality is a direct function of the time parents 
spent with their children.  Specifically, the quality of children is equal to the total 
"effective" time (γiRi + γjRj) the parents devoted to the children divided by the number of 
children.  There is an inherent tradeoff between quantity and quality of children.  Parents 
enjoy greater levels of utility from having more kids, but additional children are likely to 
result in lower quality per child.  Conversely, if the quality of children were highly 
valued by parents, they would not choose to have a large number of kids.26                        
 Children, both in terms of quantity and quality, are pure public goods in the 
married households.  Once divorced, the quantity of children remains a public good as it 
still appears in the utility function of both man and woman.  The quality of children, on 
the other hand, becomes a private good if separation occurs.  In the state of divorce, each 
parent can only enjoy the quality generated from the contribution made by him or herself.  
The transformation of the quality of children from being a public good within marriage to 
a private good outside marriage is meant to capture the loss of economies of scale in 
childcare caused by divorce.  
 In the marriage, members of the household essentially formulate their decisions 
in two stages.  In the first stage, they simultaneously make the time-allocation choices 
between earning wages in the labor market and caring for children at home given the 
conjecture about what the other person does.  Once the amount of time spent on childcare 
                                                
26 The way we model the quantity and quality of children preserves the essence of the Becker 
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is determined, each individual picks the number of children (ni and nj) to maximize on the 
quantity-quality tradeoff in the second stage.  The quantity of children that ends up in the 
household is a joint function of both individuals’ choices, i.e., N = N(ni, nj) with N' > 0.  
Hence, each individual's static utility maximization problem within marriage can be 



















    
    
 In the model, individuals can only give birth within marriage.  After the marriage 
dissolves, they are not allowed to have additional kids.  Each person's static optimization 

















    
  
To adequately address the effects of marital instability on fertility patterns, we 
need to develop an intertemporal framework.  In the dynamic story, there is a total of T 
time periods.  At the beginning of each period t, θt, the compatibility between the couple, 
is revealed.  After that, each individual makes the choices in the following order: (1) 
                                                                                                                                  
framework in that the shadow price of the child quality is proportional to the quantity of children 
and the shadow price of quantity is positively related to the level of quality.      
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marital dissolution, (2) labor supply, and (3) fertility.27  After the initial period 0, the 
compatibility parameter in each period is θt = θt-1 + ε t where ε t is a random shock to the 
compatibility and ε t ~ N(0, σ
2).  The intertemporal maximization problem for each 
individual within marriage is:  
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3.3       Effect of Fertility Choice on the Probability of Divorce 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, there is possibly an interdependent relationship 
between childbearing and marital dissolution.  To fully understand how the incentive to  
give birth is distorted in a strained marriage, we need to examine the influence of the 
presence of children on marital stability.  The set-up of our framework facilitates the 
                                                
27 In the initial period 0, we assume that the couple agrees to enter marriage upon observing the 
compatibility parameter θ0.  We also assume that neither partner has any kids prior to the 
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analysis of this issue.  In the model, the fertility choice is determined at the end of each 
period and the decision regarding marriage is made at the beginning of each period (right 
after the observation of the compatibility factor).  Hence, we can ascertain the effect of 
childbearing behavior on marital stability by finding out how the critical compatibility 
value28 in period t is altered by an additional child in period t-1.     
In order to demonstrate the impact of children on the probability of divorce, we 
need to do the following: (1) illustrate the concavity of the value function, )( t
i
tV θ , (2) 
characterize *itθ , the critical compatibility value for person i at period t, (3) determine 
how *itθ  changes with 
i
tn 1−  and 
j
tn 1− , the "chosen" number of new kids by both spouses 
in the previous period.  
  The set of state variables in the dynamic model includes the marital status, the 
existing number of children, the wage rates, and the compatibility parameter.  Each 
person's value function at the beginning of period t (right after the realization of θt) is 

































                                                                                                                                  
marriage.  Hence, both spouses devote all of their time to working in the labor market in the initial 
period. 
28 The critical compatibility value is the minimum level of compatibility that would allow one to 
stay in the marriage.  The critical level of compatibility is individual-specific, not couple-specific. 
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where  β = the discount rate 
              E[ ·] = the expectation operator  
  P = the probability of staying married in period t+1 
Vit+1(m) = the value function at period t+1 if the person is married 
  Vit+1(d) = the value function at period t+1 if the person is divorced 
  
 The proof of the concavity of the value function can be found in Chapter 2.  Once 
the concavity of Vit(θt) is established, the optimal policy regarding marital dissolution can 
be easily shown in Figure 3.1 (on next page). 
From Figure 3.1, it is clear that following the optimal dissolution policy, person i 
would choose to get a divorce in period t if θt < *
i
tθ , and to stay in the marriage if θt > 
*itθ .  Thus, we can rewrite the value function from equation (3.6) as below:  
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We now proceed to characterize *itθ , the critical compatibility value for person 
i in period t.  From equation (3.7), we know that the if the value of the compatibility 
parameter equals to *itθ , person i would be indifferent between dissolving the marriage 
or not and the following identity must hold true at the margin:  
 










If we plug the expressions from equations (3.3) and (3.4) into equation (3.8), we 







































































t  are the number of hours person i works in the labor market in 
the state of divorce and the state of marriage respectively.  From equation (3.9), *itθ , the 
critical compatibility level from person i's perspective can be characterized as below:     
 
































































Differentiating *itθ  with respect to 
i












































































 Unless the amount of time spent on childcare by person i in the state of divorce 
exceeds that spent by both i and j combined in the state of marriage, i.e., ))(( dLH it
i
t −γ  














 is negative.  The implication of the 









 is that the probability of staying in the marriage increases with 












.  This result is consistent with numerous empirical 
studies that found the stabilizing influence of children on marriage.  In the context of our 
model, the rationale is that the loss of economies of scale in childcare caused by marital 
separation would be greater with more kids.  Hence, the incentive to divorce diminishes 
as the couple has a larger number of children.                        
 If we differentiate *itθ  with respect to 
j
tn 1− , we find a symmetric result as taking 
the derivative of *itθ  with respect to 
i
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t −+− γγ , the expression 
in equation (3.12) should be less than zero.  Thus, it is also less likely for the spouse to 
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end the marriage if there are more children in the family.  The findings in this section are 
summarized below by Result 1 (derivation for the second derivatives of the probability of 
preserving the marriage is shown in appendix 3.1):  
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3.4       Effect of Changes in Probability of Divorce on Fertility Decision 
 
Now we have confirmed that additional children in a family would stabilize the 
marriage, we can focus on the reverse causal relationship: how does the expectation of 
marital separation affect the childbearing decision?   
In the model, the fertility choices ( itn , 
j
tn ) are made at the end of each period.  
Hence, the value function of person i with respect to the decision to bear children is:  
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 Equation (3.14) characterizes itn *, the optimal number of children chosen by 
person i in period t, given the belief about person j's choice and the expected probability 
of divorce in period t+1.   
 Differentiating equation (3.6) with respect to itn 1− , person i's choice with regard 
to the number of children in period t-1, we have the following Benveniste-Scheinkman 



























































Also, differentiating the value function for individual i in the state of divorce29, 




















































If we push the time period in equation (3.15) and (3.16) forward by one, we have 
the following: 
 
                                                



































































































































We plug equations (3.17) and (3.18) into equation (3.14), we get the following 
Euler equation for person i:  
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 By symmetry, the Euler equation for person j is: 
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 The system of Euler equations above (3.19 and 3.20) characterizes the Cournot 
solution for the optimal number of new children in period t.  From equation (3.19) and 
(3.20), we can proceed to address how changes in the expected compatibility may sway 









.   
 The expected compatibility parameter in period t+1, )( 1+tE θ , has an effect on 
the optimal choice of new kids in period t for both person i and person j.  We can 
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 If we assume that the system (equations 3.21 & 3.22) is stable, then the value 
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 Due to the complexity of the two expressions above, it is difficult to directly 






































.  However, we can 
solve this problem by breaking down the equations and comparing them by parts.  We 
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.  We denote the difference 
between the ith term on the right-hand side of (3.26) and the ith term on the right-hand 
side of (3.27) as Di.  That is, D1 is the difference between the first term in (3.26) and the 
first term in (3.27) and we express D1 in the following equation: 
 





























.   
 
 It follows that:   
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 The details of each comparison are shown in Appendix 3.2.  It turns out that 






















 as long as person i' has greater earning potential than person j.  


















.  From Appendix 


















 when there is a wage disparity in favor of person i, 























































































 (with the assumption of a higher wage rate for person i).  On the other 


























 < 0 (again, 
with the assumption that person i has a higher wage rate).  Denoting person i as the wife 
and person j as the husband, we summarize the implications derived in this section by 
Result 2.                  
 
Result 2:  Responding to marital instability, childless wives would be more likely to give 
birth if they have higher wage rates than their husbands.  
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The intuition behind Result 2 is as follows.  In the model, each person can marry 
only once and is not allowed to bear children outside marriage.  In addition, individuals 
derive utilities from children as well as from the market consumption good.  As the 
likelihood of separation becomes greater, a woman may want to have (more) kids as she 
gains satisfaction from them.  If the marginal utility obtained from having children is 
diminishing, the desire to bear children should be especially strong for women who do 
not have any kids. 30  Raising children, however, may take a great deal of time away 
from her labor market activities which in turn leads to a lower wage and less 
consumption of the market good in the possible state of divorce if her wage rate is lower 
than that of the husband.  If the wife has a higher wage rate than the husband, on the 
other hand, she would not have to devote as much time to childcare since her comparative 
advantage lies within the labor market.  Hence, childless women with higher wage rates 
than their husbands are most likely to bear children as marriage becomes less stable.   
 
3.5       Descriptive Statistics  
 
In the rest of this paper, we attempt to verify the theoretical prediction that 
women without prior children are more likely to give birth as a response to marital 
instability if they have higher wage rates than their husbands.    
The data set used to test the theory is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1979 (NLSY79) that followed approximately 12,000 young men and women (who were  
                                                
30 On the other hand, there should be a lack of desire to bear children as the likelihood of 
dissolution rises for women who already have children.  Lillard and Waite showed that is indeed 
the case in their paper.  
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14-22 years old when they were first surveyed in 1979) from 1979 to 1998.  From the 
panel, we find that women on average divorced at the age of 28.  We compare the fertility 
behavior of divorced women during the last two years of marriage with that of non-
divorced women between age 26-28 based on the relative wage rates to the husbands and 
whether or not they have prior children.  Table 3.1 and 3.2 are based on whether women 
have higher wage rates than their husbands three years prior to the separation (for the 
divorcees) or at the age of 25 (for the non-divorcees).  Table 3.3 and 3.4 are based on if 
wives have wage rates at least 1.5 times as high as husbands' wage rates.  Finally, Table 
3.5 and 3.6 are based on whether wives have wages at least twice as high as husbands' 
wages.   
Examining Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the possibility of separation has roughly the same 
effect on childbearing between the high-wage and low-wage (relative to the husbands) 
women.  However, as a response to divorce, women with prior kids are less likely to give 
birth while women without prior kids are more likely to give birth.  This observation 
seems to confirm our intuition that women who do not have prior kids may want to bear 
children as the probability of marital dissolution increases.  
In Tables 3.3 and 3.4, the ratio of wage differential between wife and husband is 
raised to 1.5.  From Table 3.3, we see that among the women who have prior children, 
those whose wages are not 1.5 times greater than those of their husbands are much less 
likely to give birth compared with those whose wages are at least 1.5 times higher.  For 
the low-wage women, the proportion that gave birth declines from 46.3% to 32.6%.  For 
the high -wage women, the fraction is lowered from 52.3% to 46.8%.  The double 
difference is 8.2% with a t-statistic of approximately 1.  This preliminary finding 
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suggests that marital separation may have differential effects on the fertility behavior 
depending on the relative wage rates.  Turning attention to Table 3.4, among those 
without prior children, there is not a striking difference between the high-wage and low-
wage women in terms of childbearing behavior.  The double difference is only 2.2%.   
The ratio of wage differential is further increased to 2 in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.  
Table 3.5 tells us a similar story as Table 3.3 in that for women who have prior kids, 
those without significantly higher wages than the husbands are less likely to bear children 
as the likelihood of divorce rises.  Table 3.6 kind of confirms the theoretical prediction 
that the likelihood to bear children for childless women on the brink of marital 
dissolution is greater if they have higher wage rates than their husbands.  Responding to 
divorce, the birth rate for women who have wages at least twice as high as those of their 
spouses rises from 9.3% to 17.35% while the birth rate for women whose wages are not 
twice as high only increases from 10.8% to 13.6%.  This accounts for a double difference 
of 5.2% with a t-statistic of 1.16.            
The general patterns from Tables 3.1-3.6 (especially Table 3.6) seem to support 
our hypothesis.  However, we still need to test the theory in a more rigorous fashion.  The 
formal econometric model used for testing is introduced in the next section.  
 
3.6 Econometric Model   
 
As shown in the theoretical model, the decisions to bear children and to dissolve 
marriage are interdependent.  When we estimate how the fertility patterns may be altered 
by the prospect of a divorce, we also need to account for the potential effect of additional 
children on marital stability.  Hence, we need to estimate a system of two equations with 
 91 
the divorce and fertility variables being endogenous.  This system of equations is 
specified as below: 
 
(3.33) Prob(Divorce =1) = F(ß1'Xi)  
 
Where Divorce = 1 if the respondent divorced between 1993-1998.   
     = 0 if the respondent didn't divorce between 1993-1998  
F = the standard normal distribution.  
Xi = a set of demographic and economic var iables (including the fertility    
        variable indicating whether the respondent gave birth between 1990-1992).  
 
(3.34) Prob(Birth =1) = F(ß2'Yi) 
 
Where Birth = 1 if the respondent gave birth between 1990-1992. 
                     = 0 if the respondent didn't give birth between 1990-1992. 
Yi = another set of demographic and economic variables (including the variable   
        specifying if the respondent has a subsequent divorce from 1993-1998).31 
 
 Consistent estimation of the above system of equations would simultaneously 
reveal whether the birth of a child between 1990 and 1992 affects the (observed) 
subsequent marital stability between 1993 and 1998 and whether the expectation of 
marital dissolution influences the decision to give birth between 1990 and 1992.    
                                                
31 The descriptions of all the variables in the regressions are listed in Table 1.  
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 A two-stage method is used to estimate the system of probit equations.  In the 
first stage, both the divorce and birth variables are regressed against all the exogenous 
variables in the system, {X ∩ Y}.  In the second stage, the predicted probabilities of 
childbirth and divorce, computed from the first-stage estimates, are then used as 
regressors in equation (3.33) and (3.34) respectively.  The divorce equation is 
overidentified by the exclusion of the variables regarding wages, the number of siblings, 
and whether there are kids in the household before 1990.  The childbirth equation is 
identified by the variable indicating whether the couple lived together prior to the 
marriage.32        
 
3.7 Description of the Sample 
 
The year 1992 is selected as the sample year for the cross-section regression 
analysis for two reasons.  First, almost all the respondents in the sample had reached the 
marriage age by 1992.  Second, there are still enough years left in the panel to allow the 
observation of the subsequent marital history, i.e., whether the respondent had a divorce.   
Two additional restrictions are placed on the cross-section sample.  First, either 
the husband or the wife must have a valid wage rate (a wage greater than $0 and less than 
$200) in at least one year from 1989 to 1998.  The measure of wage disparities between 
husband and wife in the regressions is based on the wages in 198933 , the year of 
conception for a child born in 1990.  The wage rate for a given year is calculated as the 
                                                
32 A survey conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that couples who 
had lived together before marriage are more likely to get divorced than those who hadn't live 
together at first.  
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total earned income divided by the number of hours worked in that year.  If the wage data 
is invalid for a particular woman in 1989, we substitute it with her/his wage in 1990.  If 
the wage data for the year 1990 is also invalid, we use the wage in 1991 as a proxy for 
the wage in 1989, so on and so forth.  In the case when the woman does not have a valid 
wage from 1989 to 1998, we denote her wage in 1989 as zero.  However, if her spouse 
also lacks a valid wage during that span, she is excluded from the sample.      
Second, only women whose marriages last for at least four years (before 1992) 
are included in the sample.  This condition is in place to ensure that all couples had been 
married for at least one year prior to the conception of a child who was born between 
1990 and 1992.                     
Overall, there are 1,869 couples who had valid wage rates and had been married 
for a minimum of four years.   
 
3.8 Estimation Results 
 
Before proceeding to discuss the results of estimation, we need to address how to 
explicitly test the hypothesis in the two-stage framework. 
The theory predicts that childless women who have higher wages than their 
husbands are likely to give birth as their marriages destabilize.  We detect preliminary 
evidence of that from Table 3.6 when we increase the ratio of wage differential between 
wife and husband to 2.  From the cross-section sample shown in Table 3.8, we see that in 
1989, 31.6% of the married women have higher wage rates than their husbands 
(dwage189), 17.4% have wages at least 1.5 times higher (dwage289), and 13.2% have 
                                                                                                                                  
33 Suppose a child was born in 1990, the decision to become pregnant was most likely made in 
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wages at least twice as high (dwage389).  Initially, we create dummy variables indicating 
whether the woman has a wage rate that is higher, 1.5 times higher, or 2 times higher than 
the husband's wage rate to represent wage disparities in the households.  These dummies 
are interacted with the predicted probability of divorce estimated from the first stage and 
the dummy variable indicating whether there are no prior kids in the family (i.e., 
dwage189 × predicted probability of divorce × noprekid, etc) to test the validity of the 
theory in the second-stage childbirth equation.  However, none of these wage disparity 
variables and interaction terms turned out to be significant.  The regression results with 
those wage-disparity dummies are not included in this paper.   
 After failing to obtain significant results with the wage-differential dummies, we 
simply express the wage disparity within the household as a continuous variable.  In the 
unconstrained version of the estimation, the wife's wage and the husband's wage are 
regressed as two separate variables in the equation.  In the constrained version, the 
difference between the wife's wage and the husband's wage is regressed.  The results 
from the unconstrained model are presented in Tables 3.9-3.12 and the results from the 
constrained model are shown in Tables 3.13-3.16.   
A. The Unconstrained Model        
In the unconstrained model, the respondent’s wage (Owage89) and the spouse’s 
wage (Swage89) are regressed separately.  The reduced-form and structural probit 
equations for marital dissolution are presented in Tables 3.9 and 3.10 respectively.  
Examining the structural equation for divorce, we see that as a woman becomes one year 
                                                                                                                                  
1989.  Hence, the wage rate in 1989 instead of 1990 is used as a determinant of childbirth.  
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older (age92), she is1.9 percent less likely to get divorced.34  The age of the husband, on 
the other hand, has no significant effect on the probability of divorce.  At the same time, 
each additional year of marital tenure (tenure) lowers the likelihood of the split at a 
constant rate (the square term of the tenure variable is insignificant) of 3%.  Together, 
this means that as each calendar year passes, the couple becomes almost 5% less likely to 
separate.  The probability of dissolution is also lowered if someone is black (3.7%) and 
lives in a non-urban area (3.5%), however these effects are not highly significant.   
Interestingly, the coefficient for the before variable seems to confirm the study done by 
the Center for Diseases Control and Prevention that couples who lived together before 
marriage are (4.6%) more likely to end up in divorce.  Finally, a 1% increase in the 
likelihood of childbirth between 1990 and 1992 lowers the probability of divorce from 
1993 to 1998 by 0.6%.  This finding is consistent with the prediction of Result 1.                
We now shift the focus to the regression for childbirth.  The reduced-form and 
structural probit equations for childbirth are presented in Table 3.11 and 3.12 
respectively.  In the second-stage childbirth regression, we include several interaction 
terms to directly test Result 2.  Inter1 is the interaction between the wife's wage and the 
predicted probability of divorce.  Inter2 is the interaction between the husband's wage 
and the predicted probability of divorce. Inter3 is the interaction term between the wife's 
wage and a dummy variable indicating whether there are no children in the household 
before 1990 (noprekid).  Inter4 is the interaction term between the husband's wage and 
the dummy specifying the absence of prior kids.  Inter 5 is the interaction term between 
                                                
34 It is possible that the older women in the sample are more old-fashioned and “value” marriage 
more than the younger cohorts do.  In that case, the coefficient on the age variable may reflect the 
cohort effect.    
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the absence of prior kids and the predicted probability of divorce.  Inter6 is the interaction 
term between the wife's wage, the predicted probability of divorce, and the absence of 
prior kids.  Finally, Inter7 is the interaction term between the husband's wage, the 
predicted probability of divorce, and the absence of prior kids.  
Examining the second-stage equation for childbirth has uncovered a few 
surprising results.  First, black women and women who have residence in the south are 
9.8% and 4.5% less likely to give birth, respectively.  Second, marital tenure seems to 
have a nonlinear negative effect on childbearing.  Third, the odds of giving birth are 
reduced by a whopping 39.29% for women who do not already have kids by 1990.  At 
last, we turn our attention to testing the theoretical prediction that the childless women 
who have higher wage rates than their spouses are likely to give birth as a response to the 
rising probability of divorce.  We can verify the hypothesis by checking the statistical 
significance of ßInter6 - ßInter7.  However, the t-statistic for ßInter6 - ßInter7 turns out to be 
insignificant with an absolute value of 0.34.     
 B. The Constrained Model    
In the constrained model, instead of regressing the wife's wage and the husband's 
wage separately, we use the difference (that is, difference = wife's wage - husband's 
wage) in the equation.  The reduced-form and structural probit equations for marital 
dissolution are presented in Tables 3.13 and 3.14 respectively.  In the constrained model, 
black women and women who live in the non-urban areas are no longer less likely to 
dissolve marriage (the coefficients have become less significant).  The probability of 
divorce declines by 1.9% and 2.8% respectively as the wife's age and marital tenure 
increase by one year.  Hence, each additional calendar year lowers the likelihood of the 
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split by 4.7%.  Living together before marriage raises the chance of divorce by 5%.  As 
the probability of giving birth between 1990 and 1992 goes up by 1%, the probability of 
subsequent dissolution decreases by 0.5% and thereby Result 1 is confirmed once again.                
The reduced-form and structural probit equations for childbirth are presented in 
Tables 3.15 and 3.16 respectively.  In the second-stage childbirth equation, there are four 
interaction terms included.  Here, Inter1 is the interaction term between the difference in 
wages and the predicted probability of divorce.  Inter2 is the interaction between the 
difference in wages and the dummy variable indicating the absence of previous kids.  
Inter3 is the interaction between the absence of prior kid dummy and the predicted 
probability of divorce.  Finally, Inter4 is the interaction between the wage  difference, the 
absence of prior kid dummy, and the predicted probability of divorce.      
Examining the structural childbirth equation in Table 3.16, we see that black 
women, women who live in rural areas, and women who reside in the south are 
respectively 10.3%, 4.9%, and 4.9% less likely to give birth between 1990 and 1992.  
Also, a 1% increase in the predicted probability of divorce lowers the likelihood of 
childbirth by 0.6%.  In order to test Result 2 in the constrained model, we need to 
examine the significance of the coefficient on Inter4, the interaction term between the 
difference in wages, the childless dummy, and the probability of divorce.  As we can see, 
Inter4 is close to being significant at the 5% level with a t-statistic of 1.85.  The marginal 
effect of Inter4 on the probability of childbirth is about 0.06.  This signifies that a one-
percent increase in the probability of divorce, coupled with a $1 increase in the wage 
difference would raise the probability of bearing children by 0.06% for childless women.  





 Once a couple decides to form a family, they invariably make investments in 
the marriage.  Perhaps the most important and everlasting form of investment one can 
make within marriage is in the children.  The fertility choice, like many other decisions in 
marriage, is made jointly by husband and wife.  Economists generally assume that the 
process through which the fertility and other choices are determined within a family is 
cooperative in nature when the marriage  is harmonious.  In good times, decisions are 
formulated to optimize the welfare of the family as a whole.  However, when the 
marriage is in trouble, cooperative bargaining may break down and the resulting 
equilibrium may become one of non-cooperation.   
 In this paper, a non-cooperative Cournot Nash game is constructed to analyze 
the issue of marital instability and childbearing and two main results are obtained.  First, 
we find that each spouse is less inclined to dissolve marriage with more kids in the family 
since the loss in the economies of scale associated with childcare is greater with a larger 
number of children.  Second, contrary to the study done by Lillard and Waite, the model 
predicts that women do not always become less likely to bear children as the probability 
of divorce rises.  Due to the utilities derived from children and the comparative advantage 
they have in earning labor income, childless wives who have higher wage rates than their 
husbands actually tend to give birth as a response to marital separation.     
Using the data from the NLSY79, a system of childbearing and marital disruption 
equations is estimated to test the theoretical predictions from the model.  The estimation 
results strongly support the notion that the addition of children to the family stabilizes 
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marriage and weakly confirm the hypothesis that high-wage women (relative to the 
husbands) without prior kids are more likely to bear children as the probability of divorce 







































Note: All the percentages in table 3.1-3.6 are the proportions of women who have given 
birth in the past two years 
 
 
Table 3.1: Women who have prior kid (wife's wage > < husband's wage). 
 
 Percentage Standard 
Deviation 
Number 
Divorced women with higher wages than 
husbands 
0.394 0.490 147 
Non-divorced women with higher wages than 
husbands 
0.503 0.502 147 
Divorced women with lower wages than 
husbands 
0.341 0.475 223 
Non-divorced women with lower wages than 
husbands 









Table 3.2: Women who do not have prior kids (wife's wage > < husband's wage). 
 
 Percentage Standard 
Deviation 
Number 
Divorced women with higher wages than 
husbands 
0.161 0.368 267 
Non-divorced women with higher wages than 
husbands 
0.121 0.327 198 
Divorced women with lower wages than 
husbands 
0.136 0.343 331 
Non-divorced women with lower wages than 
husbands 










Table 3.3: Women who have prior kids (wife's wage > < 1.5 × husband's wage). 
 
 Percentage Standard 
Deviation 
Number 
Divorced women with wages > 1.5 × husbands' 
wages 
0.468 0.502 94 
Non-divorced women with wages > 1.5 × 
husbands' wages 
0.523 0.502 88 
Divorced women with wages < 1.5 × husbands' 
wages 
0.326 0.470 276 
Non-divorced women with wages < 1.5 × 
husbands' wages 









Table 3.4: Women who do not have prior kids (wife's wage > < 1.5 × husband's wage). 
 
 Percentage Standard 
Deviation 
Number 
Divorced women with wages > 1.5 × husbands' 
wages 
0.167 0.374 203 
Non-divorced women with wages > 1.5 × 
husbands' wages 
0.111 0.315 135 
Divorced women with wages < 1.5 × husbands' 
wages 
0.137 0.344 395 
Non-divorced women with wages < 1.5 × 
husbands' wages 














Table 3.5: Women who have prior kids (wife's wage > < 2 × husband's wage). 
 
 Percentage Standard 
Deviation 
Number 
Divorced women with wages > 2 × husbands' 
wages 
0.507 0.503 75 
Non-divorced women with wages > 2 × 
husbands' wages 
0.557 0.500 70 
Divorced women with wages < 2 × husbands' 
wages 
0.325 0.469 295 
Non-divorced women with wages < 2 × 
husbands' wages 









Table 3.6: Women who do not have prior kids (wife's wage > < 2 × husband's wage). 
 
 Percentage Standard 
Deviation 
Number 
Divorced women with wages > 2 × husbands' 
wages 
0.173 0.380 173 
Non-divorced women with wages > 2 × 
husbands' wages 
0.093 0.292 118 
Divorced women with wages < 2 × husbands' 
wages 
0.136 0.344 425 
Non-divorced women with wages < 2 × 
husbands' wages 















Table 3.7: Description of Variables 
 
 
Variable Description   
Age92 Age of the wife in 1992 
Sage92 Age of the husband in 1992 
Education Years of education  for the wife 
Owage89  Wage rate of the wife in 1989            
Swage89 Wage rate of the husband in 1989  
Difference The difference between the wife's wage and the husband's 
wage in 1989 (= Owage89 - Swage89)      
Dwage189 Dummy, = 1 if the wife's wage is greater than the 
husband's wage  
Dwage289 Dummy, = 1 if the wife's wage is 1.5 times greater than the 
husband's wage 
Dwage389 Dummy, = 1 if the wife's wage is 2 times greater than the 
husband's wage 
Black Dummy, = 1 if the wife is black 
Siblings Number of siblings for the wife   
Catholic Dummy, = 1 if the wife is Catholic 
Jewish  Dummy, = 1 if the wife is Jewish 
Relifreq Frequency of religious attendance (scaled between 1-6 
with 1 = never) 
Nonurban  Dummy, = 1 if residence is in an nonurban area 
South Dummy, = 1 if residence is in the South  
Before Dummy, = 1 if the couple lived together before marriage  
Second Dummy, = 1 if the wife is in second marriage or above 
Tenure Years of marriage  
Tenure2 Tenure squared 
Kidbm Dummy, = 1 if there are kids from outside the current 
marriage  
Number92 Number of children in the household in 1992 
Noprekid Dummy, = 1 if there are no kids in the household before 
1990 
Birth92 Dummy, = 1 if the wife gives birth between 1990 and 1992 







Table 3.8: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables      
 
 
Variable Mean (Standard Deviation)   
Age92 30.85 (2.21) 
Sage92 34.48 (4.62) 
Education 12.78 (2.49) 
Owage89  7.06 (5.86) 
Swage89 11.18 (12.47) 
Dwage189 0.32 (0.47) 
Dwage289 0.17 (0.38) 
Dwage389 0.13 (0.34) 
Black 0.20 (0.40) 
Siblings 3.89 (2.74) 
Catholic 0.39 (0.49) 
Jewish  0.01 (0.09) 
Relifreq 3.25 (1.67) 
Nonurban  0.22 (0.41) 
South 0.40 (0.49) 
Before 0.32 (0.47) 
Second 0.09 (0.29) 
Tenure 9.30 (3.58) 
Kidbm 0.05 (0.21) 
Number92 1.90 (1.19) 
Noprekid 0.20 (0.40) 
Birth92 0.31 (0.46) 
Divorce 0.16 (0.37) 
 


















Table 3.9: Reduced-Form Probit Equation for Divorce (regressed separately against 
     husband’s wage and wife’s wage)    
 
 
Variable Parameter Estimate (Absolute Value of T-Statistic) 
Constant 1.3786 (2.16)   
Age92 -0.0803 (3.93) 
Sage92 0.0087 (1.04) 
Owage89 -0.0147 (1.94) 
Swage89 -0.0081 (1.92) 
Black 0.0139 (0.14) 
Siblings 0.0060 (0.45) 
Catholic -0.1085 (1.31) 
Relifreq -0.0502 (2.21) 
Nonurban -0.0983 (1.08) 
South 0.0834 (1.04) 
Before 0.3275 (4.06) 
Second 0.2537 (2.01) 
Tenure -0.0442 (0.86) 
Tenure2 0.0038 (1.53) 
Noprekid 0.1737 (1.80)  
 
 
Table 3.10: Structural Probit Equation for Divorce (regressed separately against 
    husband’s wage and wife’s wage)   
 
 
Variable  Parameter Estimate  Marginal Effect (dP/dX)  
Constant 3.4793 (4.35) 0.8154 
Age92 -0.0822 (4.03) -0.0193 
Sage92 -0.5088 (0.57) -0.0012 
Black -0.1951 (1.65) -0.0457 
Catholic -0.0649 (0.79) -0.0152 
Relifreq -0.0307 (1.31) -0.0072 
Nonurban -0.1592 (1.71) -0.0373 
South -0.0595 (0.66) -0.0139 
Before 0.1953 (2.23) 0.0458 
Second 0.0696 (0.52) 0.0163 
Tenure -0.1292 (2.44) -0.0302 
Tenure2 0.0034 (1.38) 0.0008 
Probability of Birth -2.5244 (3.63)  -0.5916 
  
Note: 
1. Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 106 
2. Probability of Birth is the predicted probability of childbirth obtained from the first 
stage. 
Table 3.11: Reduced-Form Probit Equation for Childbirth From 1990-1992 
(regressed separately against the log of husband’s wage and the log of wife’s wage)     
 
 
Variable Parameter Estimate (Absolute Value of T-Statistic) 
Constant 0.5926 (1.03) 
Age92 0.0047 (0.27) 
Sage92 -0.0180 (2.20) 
Owage89 0.0164 (3.00) 
Swage89 0.0025 (0.97) 
Black -0.3267 (3.46) 
Siblings -0.0050 (0.39) 
Catholic 0.0371 (0.51) 
Relifreq 0.0260 (1.28) 
Nonurban -0.1040 (1.26) 
South -0.1904 (2.66) 
Before -0.1596 (2.16) 
Second -0.2460 (2.10) 
Tenure 0.0166 (0.30) 
Tenure2 -0.0078 (2.65) 


























Table 3.12: Structural Probit Equation for Child-Birth (regressed separately against 




Variable Parameter Estimate  Marginal Effect (dP/dX)  
Constant 2.0132 (2.27) 0.6352 
Age92 -0.0319 (1.31) -0.0101 
Sage92 -0.0139 (1.62) -0.0044 
Owage89 0.0064 (0.66) 0.0020 
Swage89 -0.0016 (0.43) -0.0005 
Black -0.3094 (3.25) -0.0976 
Siblings -0.0021 (0.16) -0.0007 
Catholic -0.0148 (0.20) -0.0047 
Relifreq 0.0048 (0.19) 0.0015 
Nonurban -0.1400 (1.63) -0.0442 
South -0.1439 (1.97) -0.0454 
Second -0.1232 (0.89) -0.0389 
Tenure 0.0028 (0.05) 0.0009 
Tenure2 -0.0064 (2.09) -0.0020 
Noprekid -1.2451 (2.96) -0.3929 
Probability of Divorce -2.4018 (2.27) -0.7579 
Inter1 0.0030 (0.03) 0.0009 
Inter2 0.0296 (0.64) 0.0093 
Inter3 0.0859 (2.29) 0.0271 
Inter4 0.0156 (1.07) 0.0049 
Inter5 5.2101 (2.60) 1.6440 
Inter6 -0.3664 (1.64) -0.1156 




1.   Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
2. Probability of Divorce is the predicted probability of divorce from the first stage.  
3.   Inter1 = Owage89*Probability of Divorce;                                                     
4.   Inter2 = Swage89*Probability of Divorce;                                                     
5.   Inter3 = Owage89*Noprekid;                                                     
6.   Inter4 = Swage89*Noprekid;                                                     
7.   Inter5 = Noprekid*Probability of Divorce;                                                    
8.   Inter6 = Owage89*Noprekid*Probability of Divorce;                                            






Table 3.13: Reduced-Form Probit Equation for Divorce (regressed against the 
difference between wife’s wage and husband’s wage)     
 
 
Variable Parameter Estimate (Absolute Value of T-Statistic) 
Constant 1.4420 (2.26)   
Age92 -0.0887 (4.39) 
Sage92 0.0074 (0.89) 
Difference 0.0035 (1.09) 
Black 0.0411 (0.41) 
Siblings 0.0113 (0.85) 
Catholic -0.1089 (1.32) 
Relifreq -0.0539 (2.38) 
Nonurban -0.0716 (0.80) 
South 0.0950 (1.20) 
Before 0.3283 (4.08) 
Second 0.2803 (2.23) 
Tenure -0.0410 (0.79) 
Tenure2 0.0039 (1.59) 




Table 3.14: Structural Probit Equation for Divorce (regressed against the difference  
       between wife’s wage and husband’s wage)     
 
 
Variable  Parameter Estimate  Marginal Effect (dP/dX)  
Constant 3.1837 (3.76) 0.7496 
Age92 -0.0821 (4.02) -0.0193 
Sage92 -0.0034 (0.37) -0.0008 
Black -0.1569 (1.25) -0.0369 
Catholic -0.0702 (0.86) -0.0165 
Relifreq -0.0337 (1.43) -0.0079 
Nonurban -0.1477 (1.57) -0.0348 
South -0.0356 (0.38) -0.0084 
Before 0.2122 (2.34) 0.0499 
Second 0.0943 (0.69) 0.0222 
Tenure -0.1193 (2.21) -0.0281 
Tenure2 0.0036 (1.43) 0.0008 
Probability of Birth -2.1516 (2.62)  -0.5066 
  
Note: 
1. Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
2. Probability of Birth is the predicted probability of childbirth obtained from the first 
stage. 
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Table 3.15: Reduced-Form Probit Equation for Childbirth (regressed against the 
difference between the wife’s wage and the husband’s wage)     
 
 
Variable Parameter Estimate (Absolute Value of T-Statistic) 
Constant 0.4663 (0.81) 
Age92 0.0133 (0.77) 
Sage92 -0.0164 (2.03) 
Difference 0.0006 (0.23) 
Black -0.3435 (3.65) 
Siblings -0.0096 (0.77) 
Catholic 0.0402 (0.56) 
Relifreq 0.0289 (1.42) 
Nonurban -0.1292 (1.57) 
South -0.1963 (2.74) 
Before -0.1616 (2.19) 
Second -0.2704 (2.31) 
Tenure 0.0169 (0.30) 
Tenure2 -0.0081 (2.75) 



























Table 3.16: Second-Stage Probit Equation for Childbirth (regressed against the 
difference between wife’s wage and husband’s wage)     
 
 
Variable Parameter Estimate  Marginal Effect (dP/dX)  
Constant 1.7467 (1.94) 0.5550 
Age92 -0.0237 (0.94) -0.0075 
Sage92 -0.0125 (1.48) -0.0040 
Difference 0.0011 (0.21) 0.0004 
Black -0.3249 (3.43) -0.1032 
Siblings -0.0043 (0.33) -0.0014 
Catholic -0.0087 (0.12) -0.0028 
Relifreq 0.0075 (0.30) 0.0024 
Nonurban -0.1551 (1.85) -0.0493 
South -0.1553 (2.12) -0.0493 
Second -0.1411 (1.01) -0.0448 
Tenure 0.0026 (0.04) 0.0008 
Tenure2 -0.0066 (2.15) -0.0021 
Noprekid -0.3252 (1.50) -0.1033 
Probability of Divorce -1.94 (2.01) -0.6150 
Inter1 0.0001 (0.00) 0.0000 
Inter2 -0.0223 (1.35) -0.0071 
Inter3 0.7929 (0.70) 0.2519 




1. Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
2. Probability of Birth is the predicted probability of childbirth obtained from the first 
stage. 
3. Inter1 = Difference*Probability of Divorce;  
4. Inter2 = Difference*Noprekid;   
5. Inter3 = Noprekid*Probability of Divorce;  













Chapter 4: Summary and Future Research Direction 
      
    In the conclusion of their paper, Lundberg and Pollak (1993) expressed doubts 
about the attempt to model marriage as a noncooperative alternating game.  In particular, 
they used a quote from Martin Shubik (1989, p.103) which is stated as follows: 
 
    The game in extensive form provides a process account of the detail of individual moves 
and information structure; the tree structure often employed in its description enables the 
researcher to keep track of the full history of any play of the game.  This is useful for the analysis 
of reasonably well-structured formal process models where the beginning, end and sequencing of 
moves is well-defined, but is generally not so useful to describe complex, loosely structured social 
interaction.  
 
 Perhaps Shubik is right in that it is not generally suitable to specify a “complex, 
loosely structured social interaction” such as marriage as a noncooperative extensive 
game.  Nonetheless, it can be useful to model certain aspects of marriage in a 
noncooperative framework if the nature of interaction is clearly stated and “the 
beginning, end and sequencing of moves” are carefully defined.  In this thesis, we use a 
noncooperative two-person game to analyze the problem of moral hazard within 
marriage.   
 Theories regarding moral hazards associated with marriages maintain that 
individuals who specialize in household production (traditionally women) are inclined to 
lessen domestic obligations and raise labor market activities as probabilities of marital 
separation rise.  This notion of self-insurance against the potential marital disruption also 
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seems to be consistent with several empirical studies.  The research in the past, however, 
did not examine the issue in an intertemporal optimization framework and as a result, 
failed to take into account crucial aspects of decision-making in failing marriages such as 
the value of marriage, specialization within households and the wellbeing after divorce.  
Once the individual optimal responses are linked to the value of marriage, division of 
labor, and the post-marital welfare, we derive a new set of predictions regarding the 
behaviors of women in disrupted marriages.     
In Chapter 2, assuming the number of children in the family is fixed, we find that 
a woman would increase the level of labor supply as a response to marital instability only 
if her wage growth is greater than that of her husband.  Conversely, if her husband’s 
wage growth exceeds hers, she would reduce labor market activities.  The reason that 
women would actually work less as a response to the rising likelihood of separation is as 
follows.  Women with low wage growth (relative to the husbands) can contribute more to 
the spouses’ welfare by spending more time on the production of domestic goods.  If they 
attempt to improve the earning power in the state of divorce by increasing the amount of 
time devoted to the labor market, they diminish the gains from marriage for the husbands 
and as a consequence, the husbands are more likely to leave them.  The time-allocation 
decision faced by these women at the margin is essentially making the tradeoff between 
the utility attainable as a single person and the longevity of the marriage.  Since the 
benefits from a longer marriage are likely to outweigh the additional wage gains from 
working in the market for wives with low wage growth, these women would work less as 
marriage becomes less stable.                                       
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 Using the data from the NLSY79, we test the validity of the theoretical prediction 
regarding labor supply, divorce probability and difference in wage growth.  In examining 
the behavior related to labor-force participation, we find evidence supports the hypothesis 
that women with lower wage growth than their husbands are likely to reduce labor supply 
as the probability of divorce rises.  However, the results also suggest that women with 
higher relative wage growth would be averse to join the labor force as well, although to a 
much lesser extent.  When analyzing the number of work hours, the results show that the 
expectation of marital separation leads to more hours worked and the magnitudes of the 
increase are roughly the same for women with different relative wage growth.     
In Chapter 3, we relax the assumption of the constant number of kids in the 
household and thereby incorporate fertility decisions in the model.  Contrary to the 
previous studies, the analysis shows that women do not always become less likely to give 
birth as the likelihood of divorce rises.  Wives who do not have any kids and who have 
higher wage rates than their husbands actually possess the tendency to bear children as 
their marriages disintegrate.  The rationale behind this seemingly odd fertility response to 
marital instability is the following.  A woman who does not have prior children may like 
to have a child as the marriage is ending35; however, she is likely to handle the majority 
of the childcare if her wage rate is lower than that of her husband due to the optimal rule 
regarding division of labor.  The intensified effort made by the wife in the household 
production translates into a lower potential wage rate and consequently, a reduction in the 
welfare in the state of divorce.  If the woman has a high wage rate relative to her 
                                                
35 Recall that in the model, a woman is not allowed to remarry and have additional kids once 
divorced.  Hence, a woman’s desire to have children should be particularly strong at the end of the 
marriage.    
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husband, on the other hand, the specialization of tasks will lead the man to share a large 
portion of the responsibilities related to raising the child.  Hence, only childless women 
who have wages greater than those of the husbands are inclined to bear children at the 
brink of marital dissolution.   
Again, we use the data from the NLSY79 to test the hypothesis regarding 
fertility.  The estimation results are consistent with the theoretical prediction.  We find 
that a 10% increase in the probability of divorce, coupled with a $5 increase in the wage 
difference between the wife and husband would raise the probability of bearing children 
by 3% for childless women.                           
 The model presented in this thesis revealed how individuals would respond to 
adversities in marriage.  The natural extension of the theory is to endogenize the mating 
choice in the initial period.  That is, instead of simply assuming the couple would agree to 
marry upon observing the compatibility parameter, we allow the two individuals to 
negotiate over the terms of the marriage contract.  In the case that an agreement cannot be 
reached, the union between the two people does not take place.  The introduction of 
prenuptial negotiations will enable us to explore how marriage contracts are constructed 
in anticipation to possible strategic behaviors that arise in unstable relationships.  Once 
we understand the structure of marriage contracts in relation to optimal responses within 
marriage, the next step is to investigate the constraints imposed on the contracts by no-
fault divorce laws and in turn identify the effects of no-fault divorce on labor supply, 
fertility, and the likelihood of marital separation.          
 In an illuminating paper that shed light on the link between information 
constraints and marital contracting, Peters (1986) analyzed the impact of no-fault divorce 
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on various aspects of marriage.  In particular, two models with different assumptions 
regarding the information about options outside marriage are compared.  In the model 
where both spouses' outside options are public knowledge, the law does not change the 
likelihood of separation36 but alters the compensation scheme at divorce37.  In the model 
where each spouse only has information about her/his own outside options but not about 
the alternatives faced by the other, no-fault divorce raises the probabilities of marital 
dissolution but has no effect on the compensation scheme38.  Utilizing data from the 
Current Population Survey (March/April 1979), Peters tested the validity of the two 
models and found strong evidence in support of the perfect information hypothesis.  The 
empirical results showed that the divorce rates are not statistically different in unilateral 
and mutual consent states and that compensating payments are less volatile in unilateral 
states.               
 The theoretical predictions from Peters’ models, however, are based on the 
assumption of fixed investments in marriage-specific capital.  Realizing that the 
assumption of invariant marriage-specific investments is not always valid, Peters talked 
about the issue of “moral hazard” as an addendum to her main framework.  Nonetheless, 
the discussion was under the premise that women would always reduce the amount of 
                                                
36 In a world with perfect information, the agents can freely bargain over the gains to marriage and 
divorce only occurs when the total utilities in the divorced state exceed the total utilities in the 
married state, regardless the rule of separation.   
37 Under unilateral divorce, the person who is better off in the state of divorce is not required to 
compensate the other party.  On the other hand, under mutual divorce, one needs to compensate 
the spouse by an amount that exceeds the reduction in welfare from being divorced, otherwise the 
separation would not occur .  The required compensating payment varies from one case to the next 
and hence one would expect the variance of divorce compensation to be greater in mutual states.   
38 In the absence of perfect information, the optimal marriage contract calls for a fixed wage 
payment from one party to the other in order to eliminate costly ex post bargaining.  The negative 
consequence of the fixed transfer, however, is the more-than-efficient number of separations.    
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time spent on household production in response to the possibility of divorce.  According 
to Peters, as long as the problem of moral hazard can be anticipated, there will be 
provisions established in the initial contract to alleviate the undesirable consequences.  
One scheme that can be used to compensate the wife for the time spent on housework is 
the specification of divorce settlement payments.  Unilateral divorce laws, however, may 
cause difficulties in enforcing the compensation payments and thereby raise the costs of 
implementing the terms of the contract.  It follows that, in equilibrium, there is likely to 
be a smaller number of marriage contracts negotiated under the unilateral rule.   
 The notion that women would always respond to marital instability by decreasing 
the level of domestic activities is shown by this thesis to be false.  Consequently, the 
analysis based on that assumption is also likely to be incorrect.  We outline a two-stage 
game below to illustrate how the framework adopted in this thesis can be extended to 
examine the structure of marriage contract and the impact of no-fault divorce.   
At the beginning of the first period, two individuals meet in the marriage market 
and observe a set of personal characteristics, including compatibility between them.  If 
they deem each other to be acceptable mates, the negotiation for a marriage contract 
ensues.39  For the sake of simplicity, suppose the contract only specifies the amount of 
transfers from one spouse to the other if separation occurs in the second period.  If 
bargaining over the appropriate level of transfers breaks down, each person proceeds to 
search for a new potential partner and the game ends.  On the other hand, if an agreement 
can be reached, both spouses make labor supply and fertility choices in the same fashion 
as described in the thesis.  At the beginning of the second period, a new compatibility 
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parameter is observed and the decision about whether or not to dissolve marriage is 
made.  If divorce occurs, a pre-specified amount of money changes hands between the 
two.   
Although the transfer is specified by the contract, it can take on different forms.  
One option is to have a constant level of transfer C.  Another possibility is to make the 
transfer contingent upon the levels of investment in household production; i.e., C = C(R) 
where R is the amount of time spent on domestic activities.  Obviously, the optimal rule 
for transfers varies under different scenarios.  But, in any case, the determination of 
optimal transfers should be a function of the expected actions in the first period, and, as 
the thesis has demonstrated, actions within marriage depend on the anticipated 
compatibility in the future.  Hence, there is a critical link between the structure of the 
marriage contract, responses within marriage, and marital instability.  Since unilateral 
divorce laws may alter the arrangement of the contracts, these rules are also likely to 
impact behaviors regarding labor supply, childbearing, and marital disruption.    
Finally, the model adopted in this thesis can be applied to any bilateral monopoly 
situation with slight modifications.  For instance, the association between a firm and its 
employee can be characterized as a union where there are mutual benefits as well as 
possibilities of separation (in the forms of quits and layoffs).  The stochastic element that 
causes the dissolution of the labor-firm relationship can be fluctuation in demand or 
advance in technology.  Using our general framework, we can study the effects of  
 
                                                                                                                                  
39 We are not assuming that these two people are the best possible match in the market.  However, 
if there were nontrivial search costs, they would settle for someone who is sufficiently desirable. 
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changes in consumer demand and costs of production on the optimal responses by 









































From equation (2.17), we know that: 
 










t ++−+++ βγ  




























































































































































































































































 would be without making simplifying 
assumptions regarding the wage growth of the household members (? i' and ? j').  If we 
assume sufficiently flat wage profiles for both person i and j, i.e., both ? i' and ? j' are 
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Appendix 3.1:   
 From equation (3.11), we can express the marginal effect of new children 












































































 From equation (3.12), the marginal effect of new children chosen by person j 



























































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 3.2:   






























 From Appendix 3.1, we know that:  








































































































































































































 if )(dL jt  is 
greater than )(dLit .  In Appendix 3.3, it is shown that an individual would work more in 


























person i has a higher wage rate than person j.   
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t ++ −  if person i has a higher wage rate 









t ++ − , it means that person j benefits proportionately more from the marriage 
relative to person i.  In the model, person i and person j are assumed to be equally 
efficient at housework (i.e., raising children), however, they may have different wage 
rates.  Because of the semi-public nature of the consumption good and the pure-public 
property of children within marriage, if person j derives more utilities from the marriage 
than person i does, person j must have a lower wage rate than person i.  
 Therefore, we can conclude that as long as person i has a higher wage rate than 
person j, D1 > 0.          
 























































∂ ++++  
 From Appendix 3.1, we have: 





















































































































































       
  


















 if )(dL jt  > )(dL
i
t .  
Again, this implies that person i has a higher wage rate than person j.       


































∂ ++ )()( 11 .  The value for each of these terms is 

























































































































































































































∂ + )(1  if )(1 dL
j
t+  > )(1 dL
i
t + , 


































∂ ++ )()( 11  when person i has a 
higher wage rate than person j.   
 Hence, D2 > 0 if person i has a high wage relative to person j. 
 























































∂ ++++  


















 if )(1 dL
j
t +  > )(1 dL
i

































∂ ++ )()( 11  if )(1 dL jt +  > )(1 dLit+ .  Thus, we can 
conclude that D3 > 0 in the case when person i has a higher wage rate than person j.    
      


































































































































































































































































.  Hence, 
whether D4 is a positive or negative number depends on the relative size of jtP  and 
i
tP .  
D4 is positive if jtP  is greater than 
i
tP .  
j
tP  > 
i
tP  means that person j is less willing to 
dissolve the marriage than person i.  In our model, the lower potential wage rate for 
person j is responsible for a greater level of utilities derived by person j from the 
marriage.  Therefore, the high wage rate for person i translates into jtP  > 
i
tP , which in 
turn leads to D4 > 0.   
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 We can alternatively write D5 as: 
 























































∂ ++++  
 












































































































































 When )(1 dL
j
t+  > )(1 dL
i
t +  which also signifies a higher wage rate for person i 























.  Also, a higher wage rate for person i 
implies that jtP  > 
i



















Appendix 3.3:  
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, i.e., how the labor supply 
changes with respect to the "endowed" wage rate.  Since we can write (A3.20) as an 













































 < 0  
 








 < 0, hence an individual would work more 
in the state of divorce the lower the wage rate and would work less the higher the wage 
rate.  The intuition behind this result is that quality of children, also an argument in the 
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utility function, depends on the amount of time spent on the kids and someone with a 
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